Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 61
Issue 1 Issue 1 - January 2008

Article 3

1-2008

Is There A Moral Justification For Redressing Historical
Injustices?
Katrina M. Wyman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Legal Remedies Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Katrina M. Wyman, Is There A Moral Justification For Redressing Historical Injustices?, 61 Vanderbilt Law
Review 127 (2008)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol61/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Is There A Moral Justification For
Redressing Historical Injustices?
Katrina Miriam Wyman*
INTRODU CTION ...............................................................................

I.

III.

Two LESS PROMISING MORAL ARGUMENTS
F OR R EDRESS ......................................................................

140

A.
B.

140
143

Redress D eters..........................................................
Redress Promotes DistributiveJustice ....................

CORRECTIVE JUSTICE JUSTIFICATIONS ............................... 147

A.

B.

IV.

132
What is a HistoricalInjustice? ................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
How Are Claims for Redress Advanced? ........ . . . . . . . . . 134
Why Are Claims Brought and What
Remedies Are Requested? ..................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

BACKGROUND ON U.S.-BASED CLAIMS FOR REDRESS ..........

A.
B.
C.
II.

128

Aristotelian Corrective Justice ................................
1.
E xistence .......................................................
2.
Violation of Protected Interest .....................
3.
Remediable Violation ...................................
Nozickian Corrective Justice ...................................
1.
Violation of Protected Interest .....................
2.
Remediable Violation ...................................
3.
Proviso ..........................................................

149
150
156
158
160
161
162
164

CASE STUDY: REDRESSING CLAIMS AGAINST

THE SW ISS BANKS ................................................................ 170
A.
B ackground..............................................................
171
Associate Professor, NYU School of Law. This Article benefited from suggestions from
many colleagues, including Paulette Caldwell, Jules Coleman, Kevin Davis, Peggy Davis, David
Garland, Mark Geistfeld, Les Green, Sam Issacharoff, Jim Jacobs, Doug Kysar, Daryl Levinson,
Eric Muller, Liam Murphy, Burt Neuborne, Stephen Perry, John Torpey, and Jeremy Waldron,
and presentations at Cornell Law School, NYC Torts Theory Group, NYU School of Law, and the
Journal of Tort Law's September 2006 conference on Tort Law and the Modern State at
Columbia Law School. I also am grateful to the organizers of that conference for selecting an
earlier version of the article as one of the two winners of the competition for papers from junior
scholars. Lesley Coben, Benjamin Geffen, and Derek Kershaw provided excellent research
assistance. I especially thank those who helped me with this article even though they disagree
with its arguments. All errors are mine. The Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg
Research Fund at New York University School of Law provided generous financial assistance.

127

128

TANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1:127

H istorical W rongs .........................................
1.
Process of Obtaining Redress .......................
2.
Implementation of Redress ..........................
3.
B.
Moral Justifiability of Redress ................................
D eterrence ....................................................
1.
Distributive Justice ......................................
2.
Corrective Justice .........................................
3.
a.
Aristotelian Corrective Justice ..........
i.
Conversion of Bank
Accounts .................................
Other Wrongs .........................
ii.
b.
Nozickian Corrective Justice .............
Conversion of Bank
Accounts .................................
ii.
Other W rongs .........................
C ON CLU SIO N ...................................................................................

171
172
175
179
179
181
184
185
185
188
191
191
192
194

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been lively popular and academic
debates in the United States and elsewhere about whether injustices
committed decades or even centuries ago should be redressed through
official apologies, commissions of inquiry, reparations, and
restitution.1 In the American context, the historical injustices for
which redress has been pursued, and in some cases granted, include
the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the
Holocaust, and the mistreatment of Native Americans. 2 Recently, the
most prominent debate in the United States has been about whether
federal and state governments and corporations should pay
reparations to African Americans for slavery and subsequent

1.
See, e.g., JOHN TORPEY, MAKING WHOLE WHAT HAS BEEN SMASHED: ON REPARATIONS
POLITICS 1-5 (2006) (surveying claims for redress).
I use "redress," "restitution," and "reparations" interchangeably unless otherwise specified.
2.
See, e.g., ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES 30-45, 169-215 (2000) (discussing redress for Japanese Americans and
Native Americans); ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS: PRO & CON xv (2006) (referring to redress
received by Japanese Americans, Holocaust victims, and Native Americans).
The Holocaust is included on this list even though it was not perpetrated by (or in) the
United States because in the 1990s a movement for redress for Holocaust-related injustices was
initiated and litigated partly in the United States. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST
JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA'S COURTS xi (2003) (chronicling Holocaust
restitution claims from the 1990s and the role of U.S. courts in addressing them).
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discrimination. 3 Indeed, in the past few years, several major books
have been published advocating reparations for African Americans,
numerous law reviews have held symposia on the idea, and many
4
stories have appeared on the subject in print and television media.
This Article examines whether there is a moral justification for
redressing historical injustices, focusing on debates in the American
context. Perhaps because the legal case for redressing historical
injustices is often weak, many supporters of redress advance moral
arguments. For example, proponents argue that redressing historical
injustices is necessary to deter future wrongdoing or to promote a
more just distribution of societal resources. 5 More frequently, they
emphasize the injustice of the original wrong 6 and argue that there is
7
a continuing obligation to correct it.
I argue that notwithstanding the prominent role that moral
arguments play in these claims, it is difficult to justify redress for
historical injustices in moral terms. This does not mean that redress
never is morally warranted. But the difficulty of making a strong
moral argument for redressing historical injustices is instructive. In
particular, it helps to explain why redress has not been implemented
in many instances notwithstanding extensive public debate and why,
when redress has been implemented, it often has been on a relatively
limited scale.8 In addition, the moral complexity of claims for
3.
See, e.g., BROPHY, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that "discussion of reparations" for slavery
and Jim Crow "has grown explosively").
4.
Sources surveying recent efforts to address historical injustices in the United States and
elsewhere include BARKAN, supra note 2; THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo De Greiff ed.,
2006); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS (1998); POLITICS AND THE PAST:
ON REPAIRING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (John Torpey ed., 2003); RETRIBUTION AND REPARATION
IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (John Elster ed., 2006); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE (2000); TORPEY, supra note 1; BRIAN A. WEINER, SINS OF THE PARENTS: THE POLITICS OF
NATIONAL APOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES (2005); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,

Reparationsfor Slavery and Other HistoricalInjustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2003).
Recent books advocating reparations for African Americans include ROY L. BROOKS,
ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (2004); CHARLES J.
OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION 292 (2004); RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO

BLACKS 244-46 (2000). Symposia on reparations for African Americans include Reparations
Symposium, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17 (2004); Symposium, A Dream Deferred: Comparative
and Practical Considerationsfor the Black ReparationsMovement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
447 (2003); Symposium, The Jurisprudenceof Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1135 (2004).
5.
See infra Part II (addressing the forward-looking moral arguments for redress).
6.
I use the terms "wrong" and "injustice" interchangeably.
7.
See infra Part III (addressing the backward-looking corrective justice arguments for
redress).
8. Of course, interest group politics also have had a significant influence on whether and
what redress has been granted. See, e.g., LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RIGHTING A WRONG: JAPANESE
AMERICANS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1988 (1993) (analyzing the factors
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redressing historical injustices raises a fundamental question about
the value of the time and resources that have been devoted to debating
the redress of historical wrongs.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides some
background for analyzing the moral justifiability of redressing
historical injustices. It attempts to define what a historical injustice is
by specifying the characteristics shared by many of the events to
which the term is applied. in the United States. In addition, it
discusses how claims for redressing historical injustices are advanced
and the range of motivations for bringing claims and remedies
requested.
Part II turns to the issue of the moral justifiability of
redressing historical injustices. It identifies and underscores the
difficulties with two of the less promising moral arguments that have
been offered in the United States for repairing historical injustices.
These are the forward-looking arguments that redress will deter the
commission of wrongs and promote distributive justice.
Part III focuses on the most promising-and the most
commonly made-moral argument for redressing historical injustices:
the backward-looking argument that there is a duty to correct
injustices in general, including ones that occurred long ago. Typically,
the corrective justice argument is made at an intuitive level, without
invoking any particular concept of corrective justice. 9 I specify two
potential corrective justice arguments for redress: one rooted in the
Aristotelian conception of corrective justice and the other rooted in
Nozick's principle of rectification. Then, I emphasize the limited
extent to which both of these arguments justify redress for historical
injustices.
To illustrate my argument that redressing historical injustices
is difficult to justify in moral terms, Part IV offers a case study of one
recent claim for redress for wrongs committed several decades ago.
That is the claim against Swiss banks that was brought and settled in
the 1990s for profiting from the Holocaust by financing the Third
Reich and withholding the bank accounts of Holocaust victims after
the war. Allegations that Swiss banks had behaved improperly during
and after the war persisted for decades, but they only drew
that led to the passage of the redress legislation); TORPEY, supra note 1, at 85-86 (explaining
Japanese American success in gaining redress for internment); Saul Levmore, Changes,
Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1688, 1698 (1999) (analyzing interest
group politics surrounding reparations).
9.
See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for
Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 707 (2004) (arguing for redress for
slavery and subsequent discrimination using the "quite basic" concept of corrective justice).
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widespread public attention in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold
War. Fascinating in their own right, the bringing and the resolution of
the claims are also historically significant because the claims were a
major impetus for the emergence of additional claims for redress
stemming from the Holocaust and other injustices, such as slavery. 10
Ten years after the claims against the banks settled, the settlement
fund that two of the banks paid still is being distributed. I examine
the program implemented to redress the claims against the Swiss
banks to exemplify the moral complexity of redressing historical
injustices. I conclude by suggesting that the difficulty of justifying
redress is an argument for generally focusing more on recent
injustices than on historical ones.
To a large extent, recent U.S. legal scholarship about redress
for historical injustices has focused narrowly on traditional legal
concerns. For example, a number of scholars have suggested litigation
strategies to keep reparations cases alive in the courts. 1 Others have
weighed the virtues of different legal strategies for obtaining
reparations.1 2 Still others have analyzed the different options for
implementing reparations. 3 This Article underscores the fundamental

10. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 307-44. Another major impetus was the passage of the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988, 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 1989b to b-9 (2000), which authorized reparations for
the internment of Japanese Americans and the relocation of Aleuts during World War II.
BROPHY, supra note 2; TORPEY, supra note 1, at 4.
ii. See, e.g., Yanessa L. Barnard, Note, Better Late Than Never: A Takings Clause Solution
to Reparations, 12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 109 (2005) (delineating flaws in the
litigation of reparations claims and proposing the takings clause as a more successful route);
Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of Reparations
Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 86-92 (2005) (describing various legal arguments available
to avoid statute of limitations issues in reparations litigation); Kaimipono David Wenger,
Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery Reparations Debate, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 279 (2006)
(discussing the problems of causation and attenuation that arise in the context of reparations);
Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 191 (2003)
(viewing slavery as a violation of the takings clause and discussing the legal ramifications).
12. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1209 (2004)
(discussing the problems inherent in bringing reparations claims under a derivative tort
scheme); Anthony J. Sebok, Two Concepts of Injustice in Restitution for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV.
1405 (2004) (advocating against the use of restitution law and language for compensating the
injuries inflicted by slavery); Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust Enrichment, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 1443 (2004) (arguing that restitution is not an appropriate basis for reparations for
historical injustices).
13. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Privatizing Reparations,84 B.U. L. REV. 1291 (2004) (setting
forth a scheme of privatized, or elective, payment of reparations); Posner & Vermeule, supra note
4 (comparing various reparations schemes for historical injustices); Alfreda Robinson, Corporate
Social Responsibilityand African American Reparations:Jubilee, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (2003)
(proposing a system of corporate reparations); Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a
Series of Unfortunate Legal Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law from
1619 to 1972 and a Challenge to PrevailingNotions of Legally Based Reparations,26 B.C. THIRD
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moral issues raised by claims made in the United States for redressing
14
historical injustices.
I. BACKGROUND ON U.S.-BASED CLAIMS FOR REDRESS

The idea that societies should redress injustices committed
long ago has spread since the end of World War II. An important
impetus has been the extensive set of programs of reparations,
property restitution, and commemoration that West Germany started
in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, due to a combination of
domestic forces and foreign pressure. 15 Building on the post-Holocaust
experience, the proponents of redress in the United States and
elsewhere seek similar remedies for other injustices. In doing so, the
proponents often refer back to the activities undertaken in the wake of
the Holocaust. 16 However, unlike the reparations, restitution, and
commemorative activities that began soon after the Holocaust, these
remedies would be instituted many years after the initial injustice.
This squarely raises the issue of whether obligations and entitlements
to repair injustices persist with the passage of time.
This Part provides some background for considering the moral
justifiability of redressing historical injustices in Parts II-IV. In
particular, it addresses three topics: the characteristics of the wrongs
discussed as historical injustices in the United States, the ways that

WORLD L.J. 207 (2006) (presenting an alternative to reparations that focuses on developing black
political, economic, and educational institutions).
14. In doing so, the article draws on other scholarship debating in philosophical terms the
merits of redressing historical injustices that occurred in the United States and elsewhere such
as JUSTICE IN TIME: RESPONDING TO HISTORICAL INJUSTICE (Lukas H. Meyer ed., 2004); JANNA
THOMPSON, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PAST: REPARATION AND HISTORICAL JUSTICE
(2002); WEINER, supra note 4; Christopher Kutz, Justice in Reparations: The Cost of Memory and
the Value of Talk, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 277 (2004); David Lyons, The New Indian Land Claims
and OriginalRights to Land, in READING NOZICK: ESSAYS ON ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 355
(Jeffrey Paul ed., 1981); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 698-711; Amy J. Sepinwall,
Responsibility for HistoricalInjustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations, 22 J.L. & POL. 183
(2006); A. John Simmons, HistoricalRights and FairShares, 14 LAW & PHIL. 149 (1995); Jeremy
Waldron, Settlement, Return, and the Supersession Thesis, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 237
(2004); Jeremy Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 135 (2002); Jeremy
Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4 (1992); Piibe J6gi, The Past That Can't Be
Fixed: Property Restitution in the Post-Socialist World (April 2006) (unpublished J.S.D.
dissertation, New York University School of Law).
15. On the historical significance of the West German efforts, see, for example, BARKAN,
supra note 2, at xxiii-xxiv, and TORPEY, supra note 1, at 4, 9, 37-41, both of which discuss the
treatment of Holocaust claims as a model for claims for other historical injustices.
16. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER, REPARATIONS: THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 6 (1973)
(referring to West German reparations in advocating reparations for African Americans);
ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 222 (same).
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redress typically is sought for these injustices, and the wide range of
the motivations for seeking redress and the remedies requested.
A. What is a HistoricalInjustice?
There is no accepted definition of what constitutes a "historical
injustice."1 7 However, it is possible to derive something approaching a
definition of the term by analyzing the events to which it is applied.
In practice, academics and others discussing historical
injustices in the United States apply the term to wrongs that are
18
similar in a number of ways. Collective agents such as governments
and private corporations 19 committed or authorized many of the
wrongs discussed as historical injustices. For instance, the U.S.
government interned Japanese Americans, and slavery was
institutionalized under the auspices of governments that sometimes
also used slaves. In addition, as the adjective "historical" implies,
historical injustices are wrongs that took place in the past, sometimes
decades or even centuries ago. 20 Importantly, many of the wrongs
discussed as historical injustices involve a large scale violation of
fundamental human rights. In particular, many wrongs referred to as
historical injustices in the United States involved invidious
discrimination against many individuals based on race, religion, or
ethnicity. Thus, paradigmatic examples of historical injustices include
the colonization of Native Americans, slavery, Jim Crow, the
removal
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the
21
Holocaust.
the
and
war,
same
the
during
of Aleuts in Alaska

17. Eric L. Muller, Fixing A Hole: How the Criminal Law Can Bolster Reparations Theory,
47 B.C. L. REV. 659, 664-69 (2006). The idea may be difficult to analyze conceptually because of
the large number of different wrongs that are labeled "historical injustices" in the United States
and elsewhere, and the potential for each of these wrongs to be considered unjust for several
reasons. For instance, slavery was wrong because most slaves were black in the United States.
In addition, slavery was wrong because it fundamentally violated human dignity.
18. Kyle D. Logue, Reparations as Redistribution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1319, 1336 (2004)
(referring to the Holocaust under the Nazi regime and Japanese American internment by the
U.S. government).
19. See, e.g., BAZYLER, supra note 2, at xii (describing claims relating to the Holocaust
against European banks, European insurers, and German companies); id. at 307 (chronicling
claims against Japanese companies for using slave labor); id. at 317-20 (chronicling claims
against insurers relating to Armenian genocide); id. at 320-28 (chronicling claims against
companies relating to African American slavery).
20. Muller, supra note 17, at 667.
21. TORPEY, supra note 1, at 47; see Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations for Slavery Right: A
Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 251, 255 (2004) (listing as historical
injustices such things as "gross violations of fundamental international rights, such as slavery,
genocide, and Apartheid").
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We can conclude that in the United States, then, the term
"historical injustice" generally refers to wrongs that share four
characteristics: (a) they were committed or sanctioned at least a
generation ago; (b) they were committed or authorized by one or more
collective agents, such as a government or corporation; (c) they
harmed many individuals; and (d) they involved violations of
fundamental human rights, often discrimination based on race,
religion, or ethnicity. This Article generally follows the prevailing use
of "historical injustice" and is concerned with wrongs with these
characteristics when discussing the moral justifiability of redressing
22
historical injustices.
B. How Are Claims for Redress Advanced?
I now turn to the ways that claims for redress for historical
injustices have been advanced in the United States. Reflecting the role
of governments and corporations in historical injustices, claims for
redressing them typically have involved collective action directed at
the legislative and executive branches of government and/or private
corporations. 23 Redress movements also often bring litigation. This
litigation is viewed best as impact litigation attempting to bolster
what are fundamentally political movements for redress. Indeed, to
my knowledge, redress is rarely provided in the United States as a
result of a judicial decision finding an actor liable for a historical
wrong. 24 Instead, when it is provided, redress typically flows from a

On why I include the Holocaust on this list even though it was not committed by the United
States and did not take place here, see supra note 2.
22. It is important to recognize that the term "historical injustice" often is used to refer to
wrongs that took place outside the United States that do not have these four characteristics. For
example, the systematic torture of political dissidents in Latin America and Communist takings
of property in Central and Eastern Europe unmotivated by racial animus are discussed as
historical injustices. See supra note 4 (identifying scholarship on historical injustices, both in the
United States and elsewhere).
23. See generally BAZYLER, supra note 2 (chronicling the movement for restitution for
victims of the Holocaust and other restitution movements of the 1990s).
24. BROOKS, supra note 4, at 99 (identifying "an unmistakable judicial indisposition toward
lawsuits that seek redress for past injustices"); see also In re Nazi Era Cases Against German
Defendants Litig., 196 F. App'x 93 (3rd Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of claims brought by
Holocaust survivor against two German corporations for cooperating in Nazi-era medical
experiments on him); In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir.
2006), affg in part 375 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (affirming dismissal of claims brought by
descendants of African American slaves for reparations from private companies based on lack of
standing and statutes of limitations); Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co. KG, 431 F.3d 57
(2nd Cir. 2005) (dismissing claims against Austria for Nazi-era property deprivations); Cayuga
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2nd Cir. 2005) (reversing judgment for tribal
plaintiffs that had awarded them damages for dispossession of land); Alexander v. Oklahoma,
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political compromise negotiated or legislated by governments. Even
when redress is the product of one or more private firms agreeing to
pay compensation, that agreement typically follows a negotiation
process with substantial government involvement.2 5 As a result, many
redress programs either are government programs or resemble
government programs in relying on administrative criteria and
26
structures.
Generalizations about who seeks redress for historical
injustices are difficult to make given the different social movements
for redress for various injustices. But a notable feature of a number of
prominent U.S. movements for redress is that at least some of the
leading participants are not themselves victims of the original
injustice. In particular, prominent participants often include the
children of the victims of the injustices or persons from the same
382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of claims brought by survivors and
descendants of survivors of a 1921 race riot in Greenwood, Oklahoma); Ungaro-Benages v.
Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of claims against two
German banks for profiting from Nazi program of Aryanization of Jewish-owned property);
Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissals of claims against
German and Japanese corporations for using slave labor during World War II); Cato v. United
States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of claims against the U.S. government
for damages and other remedies for African American slavery and subsequent discrimination
against African Americans); Hohri v. United States, 847 F.2d 779 (Fed. Cir. 1988), affg 586 F.
Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984) (dismissing the claims of Japanese Americans seeking damages and
declaratory relief for injuries resulting from internment during World War II); Iwanova v. Ford
Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing claims against Ford for compensation
and damages for forced labor during World War II); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp.
2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing class actions brought against German corporations for
compensation for forced labor and damages); Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05-CV2887, 2006 WL 3501099 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) (dismissing the claims of the Shinnecock
Indian Nation for wrongs dating back over 140 years). But see Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d
532 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissing human rights claims against the Vatican Bank stemming from
actions taken during World War II under the political question doctrine, but holding that the
doctrine does not bar property claims against the bank); Oneida Nation v. New York, 500 F.
Supp. 2d 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing the possessory land claims of three Oneida tribal
groups because of the burdensome disruption that granting such claims would cause, but
allowing non-possessory claims for compensation to proceed); Rosner v. United States, 231 F.
Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (denying, in part, the U.S. government's motion to dismiss claims
brought by Hungarian Jews for the army's seizure of property on the "Hungarian Gold Train");
Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying French banks' motions
to dismiss Jewish customers' descendants' claims arising from World War II-era plunder of
assets); BARKAN, supra note 2, at 181-87 (referring to cases brought by Native Americans);
ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1049-64 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing Nonintercourse Act cases).
25. See, e.g., Part IV.A.2 (chronicling the process by which two Swiss banks agreed to pay
$1.25 billion for actions during and after World War II).
26. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 766 ("[F]or the past
60 years, when the issue of reparations has arisen in regard to other minority groups, Congress
has dealt with the issue."); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 692 (analogizing reparations to
'large-scale governmental transfer programs").
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generation as children of victims-what might be called the next
generation down.27 Indeed, histories of the movement for Japanese
American redress suggest that many older surviving internees sought
redress reluctantly at first.28 The ongoing campaign for reparations for
African Americans for slavery and Jim Crow exhibits a similar,
although not identical, pattern. Obviously none of the leaders is a
former slave, and the persons now leading the movement for redress
29
are several generations removed from the last generation of slaves.
If, however, the injustice is defined as Jim Crow rather than slavery,
then a number of the leaders are the first to grow up since the end of
30
de jure segregation, after Brown v. Board of Education.
C. Why Are Claims Brought and What Remedies Are Requested?
Notwithstanding the similarities in the claims for historicalinjustice redress in the United States, the claims also differ in
important ways. In particular, there are significant differences in the
27. For example, the movement for reparations for Japanese Americans was led not only by
former internees, but also by the children of internees born after internment. See, e.g.,
HATAMIYA, supra note 8, at 142, 164 (describing the active role of the Sansei, third generation
Japanese Americans, in the movement for reparations); TORPEY, supra note 1, at 85 (attributing
much of the success of the Japanese American redress movement to the emergence of the Sansei
as a political force); Roger Daniels, Japanese Relocation and Redress in North America: A
Comparative View, 26 PAC. HISTORIAN 2 (1982), reprinted in THE MASS INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE QUEST FOR LEGAL REDRESS 376, 386 (Charles McClain ed., 1994)

(pointing out that leadership in the redress movement shifted to the younger generation in the
late 1970s).
28. See, e.g., BARKAN, supra note 2, at 36-37 (referring to "the early reluctance among those
of the older generation, the majority of internees," to seek redress for interment); HATAMIYA,
supra note 8, at 45-46 (noting that taking no action was the preferred course of action for many
Japanese Americans at the beginning of the redress movement).
29. However, the distance between living African Americans and slavery is not as great as
many imagine. The relatively short lapse of time since the abolition of slavery was underscored
recently by the discovery that Reverend Al Sharpton's great-grandfather was a slave owned by a
relative of the late segregationist Senator Strom Thurmond. Bob Herbert, Slavery Is Not Dead.
It's Not Even Past, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at A19. Sharpton spoke of reparations for slavery at
the 2004 Democratic Party convention. Reverend Al Sharpton, Address at the 2004 Democratic
National Convention (July 28, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/
articles/A21903-2004Jul28.html.
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Consider, for example, the backgrounds of Randall Robinson and Charles Ogletree, two of the
co-chairs of the Reparations Coordinating Committee. OGLETREE, supra note 4, at xiv, 284;
ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 8; Amitabh Pal, Randall Robinson, THE PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 2005, at
37, 40-41.
On why the generation once removed from the injustice may take up the cause of redress,
see, e.g., EVA HOFFMAN, AFIER SUCH KNOWLEDGE: MEMORY, HISTORY, AND THE LEGACY OF THE

HOLOCAUST (2004), which explores the thoughts and experiences of the children of Holocaust
survivors, and PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE (1999), which looks at the

treatment of the Holocaust in the United States.
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motivations for seeking redress and the remedies that have been
sought.
Sociologist John Torpey has developed a helpful categorization
of claims for redress for historical injustices based on what motivates
the bringing of the claims and the remedies requested. 3 ' Torpey
argues that claims for redress can be mapped along two dimensions.
First, claims can be categorized by the extent to which they are
motivated by a desire to obtain monetary compensation or the return
of economically valuable resources, such as land. 32 At the poles of this
dimension sit two kinds of claims: (1) purely symbolic claims in which
money or economically valuable resources either are not sought or are
sought mainly to affirm symbolically the making of redress and (2)
purely economic claims in which the objective is to obtain money or
economically valuable resources for their own sake. The claims for
reparations for Japanese Americans might be considered more
symbolic and the claims for reparations for African Americans more
economic. Japanese American proponents of redress seemed to be
seeking recognition of the wrongful nature of internment more than
financial compensation for the losses caused by internment. Many
Japanese Americans regarded the payment of monetary reparations
as necessary to underscore the significance of the U.S. government's
apology for internment rather than as a form of compensation.33 In
contrast, many of the contemporary proponents of redress for slavery
and subsequent discrimination against African Americans seem to
advocate it, in part, as a way of directing additional resources to
disadvantaged African Americans. 34 Notably, the revival of claims for
reparations for African Americans comes at a time when many African
Americans remain socioeconomically disadvantaged relative to nonHispanic whites, notwithstanding the improvement in the
35
socioeconomic standing of many African Americans since the 1960s.
The second dimension along which we can map claims is "the
extent to which claimants regard past injustices as having contributed
to the destruction of 'a culture,' and the role" of redress "in repairing
the damages ... inflicted on a culture." 36 At the poles of this

31.

TORPEY, supra note 1.

32. Id. at 42-51.
33. See, e.g., HATAMIYA, supra note 8, at 81-82 (emphasizing the 'conscience-clearing"
aspects of redress). But see id. at 97 (specifying the wishes of some Japanese Americans that they
be compensated for loss of property, wages, and education, among other things).
34. See infra note 55 (noting that recent proponents of reparations for African Americans
see them as a way to address socio-economic gaps between blacks and whites).
35. Id.
36.

TORPEY, supra note 1, at 58.
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dimension sit two types of claims: (1) claims stemming from an
injustice that destroyed a way of life and seeking redress to recapture
an aspect of the bygone way of life and (2) claims with little cultural
significance that are motivated by the loss of an item to which the
title. Torpey refers to this second type as
claimant claims legal
"mundane" claims. 37 Consider, for instance, Native American claims
for the return to tribes and individuals of human remains and cultural
artefacts stored in museums that led to the passage of the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act in 1990.38 The
artefacts and human remains were remnants of traditional ways of
life that, in many instances, were destroyed by colonization but
retained spiritual or familial significance to Native Americans. 39 At
the other end of the spectrum, we might put some of the post-1989
claims for the return of properties expropriated after World War II by
Communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe. Some of
these claims were for the return of real property with sentimental
value, such as old family homes, and cultural property like artwork.
But these claims also were for commercially valuable properties that
were sold or rented quickly by those who received them in restitution
programs. 40
Below, I reproduce a modified version of Torpey's visual
representation of his attempt to map claims for redress to which I
have added and subtracted examples.

37. Id. (quoting Emile Durkheim).
38. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2000).
39. See also William Bradford, Beyond Reparations:An American Indian Theory of Justice,
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 64 (2005) ("[M]ost Indians desire above all not to be made whole financially
but rather to exercise their rights to self-determine and to express their unique cultures and
religions upon their sacred ancestral lands.").
40. See, e.g., Mark Blacksell & Karl Martin Born, Private Property Restitution: The
Geographical Consequences of Official Government Policies in Central and Eastern Europe, 168
GEOGRAPHIC J. 178, 184 (2002) (describing consequences of restitution in East Germany).
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Figure 1: Typology of Claims for Redress
(derived from John Torpey, Making Whole What Has Been Smashed 57 (2006))
Cultural
(invested with group significance;
sacred in Durkheimian sense)
Native American claims
for cultural artefacts
and human remains
Native American
land claims
Economic
("about the money")

Symbolic
("not about the money")
Claims against German
industry for using slave
labor during WWII
Claims against U.S. for
WWII internment of
Japanese Americans

Claims for
Nazi-looted
artwork

African American claims for
slavery/segregation

Legal

Claims against Swiss banks
for retaining bank accounts
of Holocaust victims

(not invested with group significance;
mundane in Durkheimian sense)

Adapted and reprinted by permission of the publishers from MAKING WHOLE
WHAT HAS BEEN SMASHED: ON REPARATIONS POLITICS by John Torpey, p.
57, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2006 by the President
and Fellows of Harvard College

With this background in mind, I now turn to the moral
justifications for addressing the claims for historical injustices that
recently have been advanced in the United States. Most of these
claims are for injustices that occurred in the United States, such as
the wartime internment of Japanese Americans, the mistreatment of
Native Americans, and slavery and discrimination against African
Americans. But some of the claims are for redressing injustices that
took place elsewhere, such as the Holocaust. While many of the same
moral arguments are made for redressing different historical
injustices, there are some arguments that are particular to specific
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injustices. I indicate below when arguments are closely identified with
one or more movements for redress. My primary focus is the
justifiability of claims for redress that would involve commitments of
significant resources, such as large-scale reparations or property
restitution. I focus on claims that implicate sizeable amounts of
resources because these claims tend to be much more contentious than
claims for more symbolic measures like official apologies, memorials,
or commissions of inquiry, except when these measures are regarded
as preludes to reallocations of sizeable amounts of resources.

II. Two LESS PROMISING MORAL ARGUMENTS FOR REDRESS
I start by considering two of the less promising, forwardlooking moral arguments that have been advanced in the United
States for redressing historical injustices: the argument that redress
will deter wrongdoing and the argument that it will promote
distributive justice.
A. Redress Deters
Some proponents of redressing historical injustices argue for
redress in utilitarian terms, on the basis that it will deter human
rights violations, such as invidious discrimination based on race,
religion, or ethnicity. For example, Robert Westley, a prominent
advocate of reparations for African Americans, has written that
"[m]emorializing injustices committed in the past is ... an obviously
important way of preventing those same injustices from occurring in
the future."41 Consider also an argument that some American
attorneys made in the 1990s when suing German corporations for
using slave and forced labor during World War II, and the Swiss
banks for helping to finance the German war effort and retaining the
bank accounts of Holocaust victims. 42 These attorneys suggested that
41. Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black
Reparations?, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY? SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DEBATE OVER REPARATIONS
109, 118 (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003); see also Bradford, supra note 39, at 81-83 (suggesting
that redressing injustices done to Native Americans would deter wrongdoing); Mari J. Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323,
383-85 (1987) (asserting that reparations will deter wrongdoing because "[t]he discovery and
acknowledgment of past wrongs will educate us, and help us to avoid repeating the same
errors"); Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend or Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress and
Reparations, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 223, 233 (1992) ("[R]eparations claims, and the rights
discourse they engender ...can and should be appreciated as intensely powerful and calculated
political acts that challenge racial assumptions .... ").
42. Slave laborers were "confined in concentration camps and ghettos" and "worked to
death." Just over "half... were Jewish, the rest mostly Poles and Russians." "Forced laborers,
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the lawsuits would help to establish that private corporations that
profit from moral wrongs are as liable as the public officials who
authorize the wrongs. For these attorneys, suing European firms for
profiting from the Holocaust was part of a broad effort by human
rights advocates and others to institutionalize notions of corporate
43
social responsibility.
There are important reasons for doubting that redressing
historical injustices will deter future wrongdoing. 44 For analytical
clarity, I separately consider whether redressing historical injustices
45
can be justified as individual and general deterrence.
The individual deterrence argument is that forcing an actor to
redress injustices that it committed in the past will deter that actor
from committing the same injustices in the future. 46 As mentioned
above, in most instances in which redress has been sought in the
United States, the original wrongs involved human rights violationsprincipally discrimination based on race, religion, or ethnicityauthorized and often committed by governments and private
almost exclusively non-Jewish workers from Eastern Europe," had "harsh but better" "living
conditions" and "were often paid minimal salaries." STUART E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE:
LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II 206-07 (2003).

43. See Memorandum of Law Submitted by Plaintiffs in Response to Expert Submissions
Filed by Legal Academics Retained by Defendants at 28-39, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig.,
No. CV-96-4849 (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review) [hereinafter Memorandum]; see also Burt
Neuborne, PreliminaryReflections on Aspects of Holocaust-EraLitigation in American Courts, 80
WASH. U. L.Q. 795, 829 (2002) (describing Holocaust litigation as an outgrowth of the movement
to establish "transnational law that holds actors responsible for violations of norms of human
decency, regardless of local law"); Robert A. Swift, Holocaust Litigation and Human Rights
Jurisprudence,in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY

50, 51-52 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006) (situating Holocaust litigation in the
context of a growing movement for redress from corporations for profiting from human rights
violations); see also Robinson, supra note 13, at 323-38 (linking arguments for reparations for
African Americans and corporate social responsibility).
44. See Levmore, supra note 8, at 1687-88 (rejecting the idea that reparations deter); Logue,
supra note 18, at 1335-36 n.52 (same).
Another utilitarian justification sometimes offered is that redress-particularly in the form
of property restitution-may promote economic development. See, for example, Kutz, supra note
14, at 291, who refers to the instrumental uses of restitution in post-1989 Central and Eastern
Europe. Conventionally, though, economists are wary of property restitution because it may
create instability, disincentivizing investment. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO MARKET 59 box 3.7 (1996) (noting the economic uncertainties
produced after formerly communist states enacted restitution programs).
45. Individual deterrence is defined as:
[T]he tendency of a person who has been penalized for committing an illegal act to be
more deterred in the future from committing that act than he had been beforehand by
the prospect of sanctions .... [G]eneral deterrence ... [is] the tendency of people who

have not yet been sanctioned to be deterred by the prospect of sanctions for
committing an illegal act.
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 515 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
46. Id.
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corporations. Concretely, then, redress would aim to deter
governments and corporations-more specifically, their officers and
employees-from violating human rights.
First, consider governments. It is difficult to imagine them
being deterred from human rights violations by having to pay for an
injustice committed in the distant past.4 7 In general, governments do
not respond to monetary costs in a straightforward manner because
the monetary costs of government actions are externalized to
taxpayers. 48 Instead, governments respond to political costs, which
49
may or may not arise from the imposition of monetary costs.
Moreover, governments would seem even more likely to discount
future costs, such as reparations, given the possibility that these costs
might never be incurred or might come due long after the current
decisionmakers have left office.
It is also difficult to envision that the threat of redress will
deter corporations from committing injustices comparable to ones that
they have committed in the past. Corporations are more sensitive to
the monetary costs of redress because they are less able to externalize
costs, assuming that firms operate in competitive markets. 50 But
corporations also may discount the possibility of having to pay
reparations in the future, given the chance that the obligation to pay
may never arise.
Redress is more plausible as a strategy of general deterrence.
As suggested above, redress often is advocated as a way of conveying a
message about the importance of respecting human dignity in order to
deter governments and corporations from actions undermining that
dignity. In particular, the advocates of redress often hope that it will
change common understandings of what is morally acceptable and
51
thereby reduce the likelihood of human rights violations.
However, it is not self-evident that redressing instances of long
ago human rights violations will change public attitudes. Redress

47. Of course, the situation might be different if the payment was made for a relatively
recent injustice, and some of the perpetrators of the injustice remained in office. In particular,
individual deterrence might be feasible in countries transitioning to democracy in which past
wrongdoers still held power, for example in the military. See, e.g., Laurel Fletcher, Between
Vengeance and Forgiveness:Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence, 19 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 428, 432 (2001) (reviewing MINOW, supranote 4).
48. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 401 (2003).
49. Id. at 400-02.
50. See, e.g., id. at 377 (suggesting that sanctions are more likely to deter entities that have
less ability to externalize the costs of sanctions).
51. See, e.g., J. Angelo Corlett, Wrongdoing, Reparations and Native Americans, in
INJUSTICE AND RECTIFICATION 147, 148-49 (Rodney C. Roberts ed., 2002) (discussing the
expressive function of reparations).
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undoubtedly educates decisionmakers and the public about past
injustices when it involves an official apology, a commission of inquiry,
or the construction of a monument or a museum memorializing an
injustice. 52 However, the decision to implement redress by these or
other means is probably more often an indication that attitudes
already have changed. 53 Moreover, present-day human rights
violations such as discrimination might be overcome more effectively
by prohibiting such violations now and in the future and by drawing
attention to current, rather than past, violations. Notably, there is
little empirical evidence that redressing historical wrongs, whether
through reparations or through other forms of redress such as
memorialization, actually has changed public attitudes about human
rights.54
B. Redress Promotes Distributive Justice
A number of advocates for redress for African Americans and
Native Americans propose it as a way of promoting distributive
justice. 55 Of course, there are many conceptions of distributive justice,
52. See, e.g., HATAMIYA, supra note 8,at 84-98 (analyzing the impact of the 1982 report of
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians); Karen Lee Ziner, Brown
Focuses on Ills of Slavery, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Feb. 25, 2007, at A-01 (reporting public reaction
to the Brown University Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice).
53. Jeremy Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, in JUSTICE IN TIME, supra note 14, at
55, 74 (arguing that we would not condemn past events as violating "moral standards" "[u]nless
we had those standards already").
54. Indeed, a number of scholars have speculated that prominent instances of redress such
as reparations for Japanese Americans have had little effect on American attitudes. See, e.g.,
NOVICK, supra note 30, at 247 (1999) (doubting "claim that the Holocaust 'sensitizes' us, makes
us more alert and responsive to other, lesser atrocities"); TORPEY, supra note 1, at 105 ("[T]he
impact of the violation of Japanese-Americans' constitutional rights on . . . [American] society
remains relatively vague .... [although] the history of the Japanese-American internment has
had some effect on recent discussions of the treatment of Arab-Americans."); Yamamoto, supra
note 41, at 233-36 ("[R]eparations for WWII Japanese American internees has not necessarily
entailed a fundamental restructuring of governmental relations with Asian Americans
particularly, and minorities generally.").
55. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 4, at 36-97 (emphasizing "human capital deficiencies"
faced by blacks, such as lower educational attainment than whites, in arguing for reparations);
BROPHY, supra note 2, at xi ("Faced with differences between blacks and whites in wealth,
poverty rates, educational achievement, and health care, scholars and activists in post-Civil
Rights America have increasingly turned to 'reparations talk."'); ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 22628 (advocating reparations partly to close the "wealth gap" between African Americans and
whites due to slavery and subsequent discrimination); TORPEY, supranote 1, at 65 ("[T]he case of
reparations for black Americans is virtually the paradigm case of anti-systemic reparations,
where the central problem is the alleviation of economic inequalities said to be rooted in a past
system of domination."); Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War Over Reparations For Slavery, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1181, 1193 (2004) (describing reparations as a tool to combat poverty); FordeMazrui, supra note 9, at 710 ("[A]ddressing the social and economic disadvantages experienced
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and they often differ about what must "be distributed, to whom ... on
what basis," and whether the distribution must be in place all the
time or over a lifetime. 56 Historically, distributive justice was
associated with a distribution of holdings based on merit or desert.5 7
More recently, distributive justice has been associated with a
distribution of holdings based on economic need, equality, or another
58
concept combining these and other considerations.
The proponents of African American and Native American
redress often argue loosely that holdings should be distributed more
equally between whites and African Americans or Native Americans,
or that not enough has been done to address the needs of economically
disadvantaged African Americans or Native Americans. 59 They then
suggest that redress would lead to a more just distribution of holdings
between whites and African Americans or Native Americans. For
example, prominent proponents recently have portrayed reparations
for African Americans as a means of addressing the wealth gap
between whites and African Americans by re-distributing resources to
poorer African Americans, especially those living in urban ghettoes.
The idea that redressing an injustice committed long ago could
promote distributive justice brings to mind the theoretical debate
about the relationship between distributive and corrective justice. The
dominant view among corrective justice theorists is that distributive
and corrective justice are two distinct concepts. 60 As discussed further

by blacks may be warranted as a matter of distributive justice."); Logue, supra note 18, at 1322
(arguing that reparations for African Americans "can be defended on fairly intuitive and
straightforward distributive justice grounds"); Robinson, supra note 13, at 376 (arguing that
reparations should be motivated by a distributive desire to close the wealth gap); Westley, supra
note 41, at 126-27 (discussing distributive justice implications of paying reparations to African
Americans); see also Lindsay Glauner, Comment, The Need for Accountability and Reparation:
1830-1976: The United States Government's Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and
Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 954 (2002)
(referring to poverty levels among Native Americans in arguing for redress). But see Bradford,
supra note 39, at 73 (referring to material and other disadvantages Native Americans face in
arguing for redress, but emphasizing that Native American claims are not "pleas for
distributional justice").
56. Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237, 241 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000) (listing requirements
James Gordley suggests are necessary in order to do distributive justice); see also id. at 245-46
(discussing static and dynamic conceptions of distributive justice).
57. SAMUEL FLEISCRACKER, A SHORT HISTORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 2 (2004).
58. Id. at 4.
59. See supra sources cited in note 55 discussing distributive justice rationales for
reparations for African Americans and Native Americans.
60. This discussion associates corrective justice with what Part III refers to as Aristotelian
corrective justice, and assumes that redress for historical injustices instantiates Aristotelian
corrective justice.
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in Part III, corrective justice usually is assumed to generate an
obligation on specific individuals to repair losses that they caused to
other identifiable individuals. 61 In contrast, distributive justice is
assumed to ground more general obligations on society to assist
individuals based on one or more criteria, such as need.62 Emphasizing
this distinction, most corrective justice theorists argue that corrective
justice is not a means of achieving distributive justice. 63 One intuitive
reason for this is that corrective justice applies only to actors who
have related to each other in a certain way.
Consider a situation where corrective justice usually is
assumed to apply: an accident in which a car driver negligently
crashes into a pedestrian. Here, the car driver owes a duty of repair to
the pedestrian in corrective justice. Because corrective justice only
applies in limited contexts, it cannot be counted on as a way of
achieving or preserving a distribution based on need or any other
criterion. A transfer of resources mandated by corrective justice to
repair a wrong, such as negligent driving, could upset an existing just
distribution or exacerbate any existing distributional imbalances. Any
ability that exists to maintain or further distributive justice by
transferring resources from one individual to the other in a
relationship governed by corrective justice is fortuitous. 64 Imagine
that, in the hypothetical, I was the pedestrian and Bill Gates was the
driver. Any payment that he made would promote distributive justice,
but only because of the coincidence of my economic position compared
to his. If I was the driver and Bill Gates was the pedestrian, corrective
justice would mandate a transfer from a poorer to a wealthier person,

61. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate
Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004)
(emphasizing specificity of corrective justice theories).
62. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 312-13 (1992) (distinguishing an
individual responsibility basis of corrective justice from a collective responsibility basis of
distributive justice); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349,
351-52 (2002) (same).
63. See COLEMAN, supra note 62, at 357 ("[C]orrective justice does not sustain distributive
justice ....
"); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 80 (1995) (emphasizing that
corrective justice is "autonomous" from distributive justice); Perry, supra note 56, at 237
("[C]orrective justice is a general moral principle that is concerned, not with maintaining a just
distribution, but rather with repairing harm."). But see James Gordley, Tort Law in the
Aristotelian Tradition, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 131, 132-37 (David G.

Owen ed., 1995) (arguing that, unlike Weinrib and other modern tort theorists, many writers in
the Aristotelian tradition suggest that corrective and distributive justice are related).
64. Perry, supra note 56, at 244 ("[Clorrective justice rectifies loss on a local scale, between
two persons. As a general matter, the local mechanism cannot respond satisfactorily to the global
problem.").
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which is inconsistent with most contemporary notions of distributive
65
justice.
While advocates of reparations for African Americans often
suggest that reparations would promote distributive justice,
reparation proposals reflect some of the problems corrective justice
theorists identify with attempting to achieve distributive justice
through corrective just'ice. Consider, for example, Roy Brooks's
atonement model of reparations for African Americans. 66 In making
the case for reparations, Brooks emphasizes the unequal distribution
of resources and opportunities between African Americans and whites
in the United States and presents reparations as a way of remedying
this maldistribution. 67 Under Brooks's proposal, the U.S. government
would apologize for slavery and Jim Crow and build a museum about
slavery.6 8 In addition, to address the current unequal distribution of
resources, Brooks would have the U.S. government endow trust funds
for "newborn black American child[ren] born within a certain period of
time-five, ten, or more years." 69 The trust funds could be used to
70
finance education, business start-ups, or investments.
Notwithstanding Brooks' egalitarian instincts, the trust fund
proposal is an over- and under-inclusive way of promoting a more
equitable distribution of resources. It is over-inclusive because
wealthier as well as poorer African Americans have the same claim for
reparations based on a shared family history of slavery. Recognizing
this problem, Brooks arbitrarily (from a corrective justice standpoint
of addressing slavery) excludes children born into "wealthy black
families.., from the [trust fund] program."7 1 His proposal is underinclusive (from a distributive justice standpoint) because equally
economically disadvantaged children with no family history of African
American slavery would not be eligible for the trust funds. Perhaps
sensing the arbitrariness of this exclusion (from an egalitarian
perspective), Brooks defends excluding these children on the basis
that they have no connection to slavery.7 2 But from the perspective of

65. The example is inspired by one developed in COLEMAN, supra note 62, at 304, and
adapted by Kutz, supranote 14, at 299, to refer to Bill Gates.
66. BROOKS, supranote 4, at 141-79.
67. Id. at 36-97.
68. Id. at 157-59.
69. Id. at 159.
70. Id. at 161-62.
71. Id. at 162. Brooks envisions that trust administrators would establish income cut-offs to
account for income and wealth disparities across regions. Id.
72. Id. at 160-61, 197 (defending exclusion of children of foreign-born blacks, and children of
other racial minorities, from eligibility for the trust funds).
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distributive justice, the result remains unsatisfactory because equally
disadvantaged children are treated differently for no reason relevant
to their current resources or need. The under- and over-inclusion bear
out the difficulty of achieving distributive justice through corrective
justice.
The limited opportunity that redressing historical injustices
offers for promoting a more egalitarian distribution of resources is one
reason that a number of proponents of distributive justice are
reluctant to embrace redress for historical injustices. Egalitarian
critics of redressing historical injustices argue that it is more
important "to focus upon present and prospective costs." 73 Contrary to
reparationists, the egalitarian critics maintain that forward-looking
distributive justice should trump historically minded redress for past
74
wrongs.
III. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE JUSTIFICATIONS
The most frequently made argument for redressing historical
injustices is a backward-looking one rooted in a concept of moral
rights. According to this argument, there is an obligation to correct
injustices, and a corresponding right to have them redressed, even if
they happened long ago. 75 One version of the corrective justice
argument was used by the claimants in the Swiss banks case. In
particular, they invoked Aristotle's concept of corrective justice in
support of their claims against the banks for profiting from the

73. Waldron, Superseding HistoricalInjustice, supra note 14, at 26 (arguing that behind his
assertion that claims rooted in the past may be superseded is "a determination to focus upon
present and prospective costs"); see also Kutz, supra note 14, at 278, 296 (arguing against
property restitution in post-Communist Eastern Europe because paying reparations diminishes
the societal resources available to meet current needs); Lyons, supra note 14, at 375-76 (arguing
that Native Americans have compelling claims based on their current needs, not the
dispossession of their ancestors).
74. See sources cited supranote 73.
75. See Logue, supra note 18, at 1323 ("[Mlost reparations scholars and activists view
reparations as an issue of corrective justice, of rectifying a historic wrong." (citing Eric J. Miller,
Healing the Wounds of Slavery: Can Present Legal Remedies Cure Past Wrongs?, 24 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 45, 47 n.5 (2004))); see also Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 691 (offering a fourpart definition of reparations that suggests that reparations "typically refer to schemes.., in
which the payment is justified on backward-looking grounds of corrective justice"); Adrian
Vermeule, Reparations as Rough Justice 7 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Vanderbilt Law Review), available at https://www.law.uchicago.edulaw-pdf/public-law/105.pdf
(characterizing reparations for historical injustices as "very rough corrective justice"). But see
BROPHY, supra note 2, at xiii (arguing that proposals for reparations for African Americans "are
about both 'corrective justice' . . . and 'distributive justice' ").
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Holocaust.76 Another version of the corrective justice argument
invokes Nozick's entitlement theory of justice. Advocates of
reparations for African Americans and Native Americans have drawn
on the principle of rectification that is part of this theory. 77
This Part analyzes the Aristotelian and Nozickian conceptions
of corrective justice and argues that each conception yields a different
backward-looking argument for repair. I also underscore the
conditions that must be satisfied to justify repairing a historical
injustice under Aristotelian and Nozickian corrective justice.
This Part discusses corrective justice arguments for redress in
considerably more depth than Part II discussed deterrence and
distributive justice arguments for two reasons. First, many of the
arguments for redressing historical injustices invoke the idea of
corrective justice. 78 Second, corrective justice often is invoked very
imprecisely in arguments for redress.7 9 Few proponents of redress
have grounded their arguments in any sophisticated conception of
corrective justice.8 0 This Part addresses that failure by explaining how
the Aristotelian and Nozickian conceptions of corrective justice, often
invoked loosely by redress proponents, might ground claims for
repairing historical injustices. In doing so, this Part illustrates that
these conceptions of corrective justice offer highly contingent
justifications for redressing historical injustices. Importantly, then,
the following analysis underscores the limited extent to which

76. For a discussion of the use of Aristotelian themes in Holocaust litigation, see, for
example, Neuborne supra note 43. Neuborne represented plaintiffs in numerous Holocaust
reparations claims. Id. at 795 n.i.
77. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 39, at 57 n.298 (implying that Nozick offers a model of
redress for Native Americans, but rejecting that model); Corlett, supra note 51, at 149 (offering
"historical argument for reparations to Native Americans" similar to Nozick's); see also Tuneem
E. Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Front Door: Examining the Argument for Legislative
African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 713 (1999) (invoking Robert Nozick in
advocating reparations for African Americans); Hylton, supra note 12, at 1255 n. 186 (noting that
Nozick's principle of rectification offers a "game plan" for reparations for African Americans);
Lyons, supra note 14, at 357-58 (positing that arguments for and against aboriginal land claims
"center on what we, following Robert Nozick, might call 'historical' considerations"); Simmons,
supra note 14 (offering a version of historical theory of property rights similar to Nozick's in
support of Native American claims); see also THOMPSON, supra note 14, at xiii (suggesting that
"philosophical discussions" of duties to repair historical injustices often presume that duties are
based on historical title theories similar to Nozick's).
78. See supra note 75 (emphasizing the prevalence of corrective justice-type arguments).
79. See supra note 9 and accompanying text, referring to imprecision of discourse about
redress.
80. Janna Thompson arguably is an exception, although she does not describe her argument
as being rooted in corrective justice. See THOMPSON, supra note 14, at xx (justifying reparations
in a framework of "trans-generational relationships").
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corrective justice theories invoked by redress proponents actually may
justify redressing historical injustices.
A. Aristotelian Corrective Justice
In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle lays out a
concept of corrective justice that generates the obligation (and the
corresponding entitlement) to repair, which, as mentioned above, was
invoked by the claimants in the Swiss banks case.8 1 This Aristotelian
concept has a number of modern expositors, including Jules Coleman
and Ernest Weinrib, each of whom offers his own conception of
82
corrective justice.
For Aristotle, Coleman, Weinrib, and other Aristotelians,
corrective justice imposes an obligation on one party to another
because they have interacted in a particular way.83 Consider, for
example, the main elements of Weinrib's version of corrective justice.
It maintains that individuals who interact must remain in a position
of equality with each other.8 4 If one does something to upset their
equality, then he must restore it.85 For instance, if one neighbor steals
from another, then the thief has upset their equality and is required to
restore it by returning the object or compensating his neighbor for the
robbery. For Aristotelians, corrective justice differs from distributive
justice because distributive justice imposes a general obligation on
society to allocate goods, resources, or opportunities based on one or
more criteria, such as merit, need, or equality. Consequently,

81. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 81-102 (Roger Crisp ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2000) (discussing corrective justice); see also Neuborne supra note 43, at 829
(discussing Aristotelian themes invoked during Holocaust litigation).
82. For Ernest Weinrib's theory, see, for example, WEINRIB, supra note 63, at 56-83, and
Weinrib, supra note 62, at 349-56. For Jules Coleman's mixed conception of corrective justice,
see, for example, JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST

APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 3-63 (2001), and COLEMAN, supra note 62, at 303-28. Coleman's
earlier annulment theory is not Aristotelian because it does not impose a duty of repair on the
wrongdoer in particular. See COLEMAN, supranote 62, at 309-11 (criticizing annulment thesis).
83. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 81, at 87 para. 1132a (describing corrective justice in terms
of the interaction between two parties); COLEMAN, supra note 62, at 314-15 ("If one person has
wronged another, then corrective justice imposes a duty on the wrongdoer to rectify his wrong.");
Weinrib, supra note 62, at 351 ("Corrective justice links the doer and sufferer of an injustice in
terms of their correlative positions.").
84. Weinrib, supra note 62, at 349. Weinrib states that "equality consists in persons' having
what lawfully belongs to them." Id. Equality does not require "an initial equality in the parties'
wealth." Id. at 354.
85. Id. at 349, 354.
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Aristotelians regard corrective justice as agent-specific and
8 6
distributive justice as agent-neutral.
There is no single version of Aristotelian corrective justice. It is
possible, however, to identify at least three conditions that must apply
for one actor to be said to owe another a duty of repair under
Aristotelian corrective justice theories: the existence requirement, the
violation-of-protected-interest requirement, and the remediable
violation requirement.8 7 Each requirement limits the extent to which
corrective justice offers a moral justification for redressing a historical
injustice.
1. Existence
Under Aristotelian corrective justice, a duty of repair applies
only if the wrongdoer and the victim still exist. This existence
requirement reflects the fact that Aristotelian corrective justice is
agent-specific: as discussed above, it posits that a wrongdoer has an
obligation toward his or her victim. Recall Weinrib's conception of
corrective justice, according to which the purpose of corrective justice
is to reinstate the equality of wrongdoer and victim that the
wrongdoer violated.8 8 It would be impossible to reinstate the equality
of wrongdoer and victim if one or both no longer exists. According to
Coleman, corrective justice imposes a duty on wrongdoers "to repair
the wrongful losses for which they are responsible."8 9 Again, it is hard
to understand how a wrongdoer could fulfill this duty if he or his
victim no longer exists.
Implicitly, the existence requirement imposes a time limit on
invoking Aristotelian corrective justice to justify redressing historical
wrongs: the duty of repair ends once the wrongdoer or the victim
ceases to exist. I first consider the implications of the existence
requirement for wrongdoers, and then for victims, in debates about
redressing historical injustices.
The wrongdoers in the historical injustices that have become
the focus of debate in the United States typically were collective
86. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 62, at 319 ("[C]orrective justice creates agent-relative
reasons for acting.").
87. To be clear, these conditions do not correspond with any particular corrective justice
scholar's theory of when a duty of repair exists. They are prerequisites for invzking a duty of
repair that are either explicit or implicit in various existing theories, principally Weinrib's and
Coleman's mixed theory. For Coleman's and Weinrib's descriptions of their theories, see sources
cited supra note 82.
88. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text summarizing Weinrib's theory of
corrective justice.
89. COLEMAN, supra note 62, at 324.
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agents, specifically governments and corporations. 90 This raises the
question of when a collective agent ceases to exist. Aristotelians have
not addressed this issue because their paradigmatic applications of
corrective justice involve individual wrongdoers and victims. 9 1
Notably, the law presumes that governments and corporations
retain their identities over time, even when the individuals comprising
them change. 92 Thus, governments and firms are legally required to
pay the debts that they incurred in the past, absent fundamental
93
institutional changes, such as the dissolution of the state or the firm.
For example, as a matter of government succession law, today's U.S.
government likely is responsible for debts incurred by the antebellum
U.S. government despite the Civil War and constitutional
amendments that occurred in the interim. The U.S. government's
responsibilities persist because none of these events rises to the level
94
of a fundamental change breaking continuity.
However, even though black letter law clearly holds
governments and corporations responsible for the actions of earlier
versions of themselves, it is not easy to justify doing so. Piercing the
institutional veil that shrouds governments and firms and holding
these collective agents responsible for acts undertaken or sanctioned
by much earlier versions of themselves means forcing current citizens
and shareholders to pay for actions that were done under the watch of
their predecessors. The standard justifications for making citizens and
shareholders pay for recent wrongs committed by governments and
corporations cannot neatly justify forcing current citizens or
90. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text, discussing the fact that governments and
private corporations were the wrongdoers in many prominent historical injustices.
91. See supra sources cited in note 82 (generally discussing corrective justice in terms of
moral obligations and entitlements prevailing between individuals). I do not agree, but some
regard Aristotelian corrective justice as too individualistic to allow for group claims or
responsibility. See, e.g., Ellen Frankel Paul, Set-Asides, Reparations, and Compensatory Justice,
in COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 97, 101-02, 115, 120-22 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991).
92. Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 391, 404 (2005) ("The law of government (as distinct from state) succession is settledrevolutions notwithstanding, 'the nation remains with rights and obligations unimpaired.'
(quoting Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1927))).
93. See Gelpern, supra note 92, at 405 (discussing state succession). On successor liability
for corporations in products liability cases, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 3 (1998). See also THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 74-75
(arguing normatively for continuity presumption, except in the case of 'legal and institutional
changes" or injustices "committed by a ruler who acted against [the] ... interests of a nation's
members).
94. Whether a court would enforce debt obligations that the U.S. government incurred
before the Civil War is a separate question. Even if government succession law holds that the
U.S. government remains the same, other legal obstacles such as statutes of limitation and
sovereign immunity could keep courts from enforcing such obligations.
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shareholders to pay for acts from many years ago. Consider, for
instance, the conventional argument that the citizens of a country are
morally responsible for repairing wrongs the government commits
because citizens have the opportunity to influence the government
through voting, protests, or direct participation.9 5 This opportunity-toinfluence argument justifies requiring American citizens to pay taxes
to fund redress for wrongs recently committed or licensed by the U.S.
government, such as the brutality at Abu Ghraib. 96 Most of the
citizens who would be financing this redress had the opportunity to
influence U.S. policy in Iraq, at least in theory. But the opportunity-toinfluence argument does not justify holding current Americans
responsible for wrongs that U.S. governments committed many
decades ago. Current citizens did not have even the notional
opportunity to influence governments that were in power before they
97
were born.
Recognizing the limitations of existing arguments, two scholars
recently have offered thought-provoking arguments for holding
current members of organized groups responsible for injustices that
the groups committed under the watch of earlier members. One
scholar argues for transgenerational obligations of repair on the basis
that organized groups such as nations are "intergenerational
communities" whose members "acquire obligations to fulfil. . . the
commitments and relationships of their predecessors" "by imposing
obligations on their successors, or thinking they could."9 8 The other
scholar argues that the current membership of an organized group,
such as a state, is responsible for the consequences of the group's
earlier actions because the current membership has chosen to
perpetuate the group. 99
For the sake of advancing the argument, assume that collective
agents are still extant, as government and corporate law do, unless

95. For discussion of the opportunity to influence argument for collective responsibility, see,
for example, LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS 73-83 (1987). See also Levinson, supra note
48, at 425-27 (discussing theories of collective responsibility); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4,
at 703-11 (analyzing models of collective guilt).
96. The Pentagon has promised compensation for Iraqi victims. Christopher Marquis, The
Reach of War: Detainees: U.S. Preparingfor Influx of Compensation Claims by Abused Iraqis,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A9. But see Jon Tracy, Sometimes in War, You Can Put a Price on
Life, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007, at A19 (criticizing the U.S. military for not adequately
compensating victims of atrocities committed by U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq).
97. THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 9; Sepinwall, supra note 14, at 190, 200-02; see also id. at
190 n.43, 197-200 (arguing that other standard arguments for collective responsibility do not
obligate current group members to address historical injustices).
98. THOMPSON, supra note 14, at xviii.
99. Sepinwall, supra note 14, at 191.
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there has been a fundamental change. Furthermore, assume that
there is a moral justification for holding current generations
comprising collective agents responsible for the misconduct of the
agents when they had different members. Then consider the
implications of these assumptions for debates about redressing
historical injustices. A particularly notable one is that as long as the
collective agent that committed or sanctioned the injustice persists,
there remains an actor who owes a duty of repair. Concretely, then,
long-lasting governments and corporations may have duties of repair
in corrective justice for injustices that they committed long ago. Still,
some claims will not be justifiable under corrective justice. For
instance, imagine there are victims of ancient Rome alive today. They
could not claim a duty of repair because the Roman Empire no longer
exists and there is no clear successor state to which its debts should be
assigned.100
I now turn to the implications on the victim side of the
existence requirement for redress claims for historical injustices.
Clearly, if an actor who suffered the injustice remains alive, then a
victim who is entitled to claim repair in Aristotelian corrective justice
still exists. I call such actors direct victims of the injustice because
they experienced the injustice.
It is important to remember that direct victims entitled to
repair could be individuals or collective agents, such as a Native
American tribe claiming for the violation of a treaty right. In
examining whether a collective agent is the same agent that was
victimized by a historical injustice, we should use the same criteria
that we use to determine whether a collective agent alleged to be
responsible for a wrong is the same agent as the wrongdoer. Thus, a
tribe would benefit from a presumption that it was the legitimate
successor to the victimized tribe, absent fundamental changes in the
tribe.101
Once the direct victims pass away, can their descendants still
claim that they are owed repair under Aristotelian corrective justice?
This is an important question because some of the most prominent
claims for redress in the United States are claims by individual

100. THOMPSON, supranote 14, at 40, 72.
101. In discussing modern-day claims by indigenous nations, Jeremy Waldron suggests that
it is necessary to consider whether nations claiming redress are the same as the collective agents
that were victimized by the injustice. Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, supra note 14, at
148-50; Jeremy Waldron, The Half-Life of Theaties: Waitangi, Rebus Sic Stantibus, 11 OTAGO L.
REV. 161, 175-76 (2006). But see THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 76-77 (discussing how there are
"moral reason[s] for resurrecting [indigenous] nations and presuming that their members inherit
the entitlements of their forebears").
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descendants of individual direct victims. Consider, for instance,
reparations claims by contemporary African Americans for the
102
enslavement of earlier generations of African Americans.
A strict reading of the existence requirement suggests that the
duty of repair ceases once the direct victims of an injustice die and
that descendants have no entitlement to repair. But the duty of repair
might persist for at least some time after the direct victims pass on if
we generously interpret the concepts of existence or victimhood.
Consider two categories of arguments for longer-lasting duties and
entitlements to repair.
First, we might interpret expansively the concept of existence
to define deceased direct victims as still existing because they have
10 3
continuing interests after they die. Although the idea is contested,
philosophers including Aristotle have argued that the dead have
interests and can be benefited and harmed. 10 4 Their arguments seek to
rationalize common intuitions, such as the tendency to 'feel sorry' for
10 5
a decedent if' a project that "he invested in fails after his death."
Assume for the sake of argument that the dead do have
interests and, on this basis, exist in some sense after they pass
away.106 It seems reasonable to assume that the interests of the dead
might include the well-being of the remaining family members that
they knew while they were alive. The dead, we might think, would
benefit from knowing that their children and grandchildren had
collected reparations that they had not been able to collect when they
were alive. It is hard to believe that the interests of the dead would
extend much beyond two generations, though. The dead are unlikely

102. I do not pursue this argument, but the entitlements of direct victims of historical
injustices to repair also could be questioned on the basis that there is no identity between the
victim and the claimant. Individual identity changes over time, and we might be regarded as
distinct versions of ourselves at different points in our lives. As a result, an opponent of redress
might argue that a direct victim of a forty-year-old injustice is not entitled to redress because the
person's identity has changed in the intervening decades. THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 162 n.6.
103. Id. at 113. See generally Joan C. Callahan, On Harming the Dead, 97 ETHICS 341 (1987)
(arguing that, despite scholarly assertions to the contrary, it is not possible to harm the dead).
104. Aristotle speculated that the well-being of the dead could be improved or diminished by
"the fortunes of a person's descendants and all his friends," although only marginally.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 81, Book I, ch. 11; see also George Pitcher, The Misfortunes of the Dead,
21 Am.PHIL. Q. 183 (1984) (arguing that "the dead can be harmed').
105. Callahan, supra note 103, at 341; see also Pitcher, supra note 104, at 183-84 (arguing
that a dead person is harmed when the business that she built collapses after her death).
106. The following argument comes from Michael Ridge, Giving the Dead Their Due, 114
ETHICS 38, 42-45, 52 (2003), who offers it as an argument for reparations for African Americans.
Another source suggesting that the continuing interests of the dead could ground claims is Tyler
Cowen, How Far Back Should We Go? Why Restitution Should Be Small, in RETRIBUTION AND
REPARATION IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, supranote 4, at 17, 29.
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to have had any contact with descendants further down the line. 10 7
Thus, even if the dead have interests, those interests might justify
redress only to their children and grandchildren. The duty of repair
probably would cease after these generations passed away.
Second, we might extend the concept of victim to define
descendants of direct victims as victims of the injustice. There are two
main versions of the descendants-as-victims argument for allowing the
duty of repair to persist even after direct victims have passed
away. 0 8 Under one version, descendants are victims because the
suffering of their forebears left the forebears less able to support their
descendants materially and emotionally. 10 9 While probably more
plausible to many people than the dead-still-exist argument, this
descendants-as-victims argument is still problematic. The descendants
may not have existed absent the injustice because their forebears
might never have met or had children if they had not suffered the
injustice.11 0 Furthermore, assuming the descendants are deprived in
some way, the current plight of the descendants may not be
attributable to the injustice that their forebears endured. If the
injustice occurred many years ago, the descendants' plight may be due
partially or wholly to other factors, including choices made by their
forebears.1 1 ' Like the dead-still-exist argument, then, this argument
may not support claims by descendants more than roughly two
generations removed from the direct victims, given the ways that
circumstances tend to change and opportunities for individual choice
multiply over time.
Under a second version of the descendants-as-victims
argument, descendants could claim that they are victims because the
injustice deprived them of their inheritance rights. 11 2 Difficulties also
abound with this argument. First, the argument presumes the
legitimacy of inheritance rights. Although inheritance rights are

107. Ridge, supra note 106, at 52, 55.
108. These two arguments and others for claims by descendants are critiqued in THOMPSON,
supra note 14, at xix-xxi, 104-12; Ridge, supra note 106, at 38-42; Sepinwall, supra note 14, at
215-26. See also THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 130-47 (reconceptualizing descendants' harm);
Sepinwall, supra note 14, at 226-28 (same).
109. THOMPSON, supranote 14, at 104.
110. Id.; Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, supra note 14, at 12. But see Sepinwall,
supra note 14, at 222-24 (arguing that the child of slaves can claim reparations even if she would
not have been born absent slavery).
111. THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 105-06; Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, supra
note 14, at 7-14.
112. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 107-12 (discussing inheritance-based claims);
Ridge, supra note 106, at 38-42 (same); Sepinwall, supra note 14, at 218-22 (discussing
inheritance-based claims to reparations for slavery).
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widely established as a matter of positive law, they face many
normative critiques.11 3 For example, allowing individuals to pass on
wealth may perpetuate and exacerbate inequalities." 4 Inheritance
rights also may negatively affect societal welfare. While some
individuals may labor to leave large inheritances and thereby increase
social welfare, receiving an inheritance might discourage beneficiaries
from working and thereby reduce social welfare. Second, this
argument probably also provides support only for claims of
generations once- or twice-removed from the direct victims. It is
difficult to imagine people born more than two generations after a
direct victim being able to establish that their generations would have
received the inheritance that the direct victim could not bequeath to
the first post-injustice generation. The direct victims are unlikely to
have known members of the third or later generations born after
them. Moreover, the direct victims and the intervening first and
second generations might have made choices that deprived the later
5
generations of the inheritance."
In summary, the existence requirement central to Aristotelian
corrective justice imposes a time limit on claims for redress for
historical injustices. That time limit prevents claims from being
brought against, and by, collective agents such as governments or
corporations that have ceased to exist. Moreover, even under generous
interpretations of the existence requirement, only direct individual
victims and the generations of their children and grandchildren likely
can claim that they are entitled to redress.
2. Violation of Protected Interest
A second condition for invoking the Aristotelian duty of repair
is that the wrongdoer must have violated a protected interest of the
victim. There is not a single list of protected interests that all
corrective justice theorists agree on. Usually, though, bodily integrity
and core property rights are among the interests that, when violated,
1 16
trigger a duty of repair.
113. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 108-11; Kutz, supra note 14, at 294; Ridge, supra
note 106, at 41; Sepinwall, supra note 14, at 220.
114. THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 110.
115. THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 111-12; Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, supra
note 14, at 7-14; Sepinwall, supra note 14, at 219-20; see also THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 124,
128-29 (defending limited inheritance rights, in particular for children and grandchildren).
116. Perry, supra note 56, at 239; see Weinrib, supra note 62, at 354 (describing protected
interests). Coleman's theory seems to condemn violations of bodily integrity through the concept
of wrongdoing, and property rights violations through that concept and his concept of wrongs.
COLEMAN, supra note 62, at 330, 332, 354.
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Most of the historical injustices for which redress has been
sought involve violations of core property rights (such as
uncompensated takings of real property) and/or interference with
bodily integrity (such as enslavement). 117 As a result, the requirement
for a violation of a protected interest would seem to pose little
difficulty for grounding claims to redress historical injustices in an
Aristotelian duty of repair.
Still, two aspects of this requirement bear emphasizing because
they may pose obstacles to grounding a claim for repair in Aristotelian
corrective justice in particular cases. First, the requirement is that the
claimant has suffered a violation of one of his protected interests by
the wrongdoer against whom he is claiming. A victim cannot transfer
his entitlement to repair to someone who was not harmed by the
wrongdoer. To some extent, this prohibition on transfer is enforced
through the existence requirement, but it is also an aspect of the
covered protected interests requirement that can have bite. A
claimant is not entitled to corrective justice if the claimant cannot
point to an interest of his that has been violated by the alleged
wrongdoer.
A second aspect of the protected interest requirement worth
underscoring concerns the significance of the prevailing positive law
when the injustice took place. One argument sometimes made in
opposition to redressing historical injustices such as African American
slavery is that the injustice was legally authorized when it took
place.118 However, the contemporaneous legality of the injustice is
irrelevant in determining whether there is an Aristotelian duty of
repair. Because corrective justice imposes moral, not legal, obligations,
what matters is whether the interest is protected under the concept of
protected interest undergirding the theory of corrective justice. 11 9 If

117. See text accompanying note 21, referring to the colonization of Native Americans,
slavery, Jim Crow, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the removal of
Aleuts in Alaska during the same war, and the Holocaust as paradigmatic examples of historical
injustices.
118. Sepinwall, supra note 14, at 211 ("[Slome opponents of Black reparations argue that
precisely because slavery was legal, it was not wrong and hence ought not to be subject to
demands for compensation.").
Scholars also have argued that contemporaneous legal authorization should not be a legal
bar to recovery now for slavery or other injustices. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and
Slavery: On Incomplete Com modification, IntergenerationalInjustice, and Legal Transitions, 84
B.U. L. Rev. 1139, 1164-74 (2004); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional
Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARv. L. REV. 761, 791-800 (2004) (discussing techniques used
to apply laws retroactively in countries transitioning to democracy).
119. Forde-Mazrui, supranote 9, at 713 (arguing that "legal toleration of a practice" does not
protect it "from moral condemnation").
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the prevailing law violated a protected interest, that law would be
merely another example of the injustice.
3. Remediable Violation
A third condition for invoking an Aristotelian duty of repair is
that it must be possible for the violation of the victim's protected
interest to be remedied. Corrective justice does not just identify
grounds of responsibility (i.e., violations of protected interests) and
actors who can claim and be held responsible on those grounds (i.e.,
victims and wrongdoers). It also has an endpoint-remedying
violations of protected interests. If those violations cannot be
remedied, then logically there is no basis for claiming a duty of repair.
Different corrective justice theories define the remedies that
corrective justice mandates differently. Hence, the theories suggest
different tests for assessing whether the violation that the victim has
suffered could be remedied consistently with corrective justice.
Consider as examples Weinrib's and Coleman's conceptions of the
remedy that corrective justice contemplates.
According to Weinrib, the remedy that corrective justice
prescribes is a transfer from the wrongdoer to his victim that restores
the victim-wrongdoer equality that the wrongdoer upset. 120 Hence,
there is no duty of repair if equality cannot be restored. Weinrib
assumes that the wrongdoer can restore the equality that the wrong
destroyed by paying the victim monetary compensation. However, it is
debatable whether cash compensation always can restore the equality
between victim and wrongdoer. Imagine that the wrongdoer violated
the victim's property rights by taking a painting from her and
destroying it. Paying the victim cash compensation likely could restore
the equality between the wrongdoer and victim. But what if the
wrongdoer took part of the victim, such as her arm or leg, by beating
her? Whether we would regard compensation as restoring the equality
between victim and wrongdoer would depend on whether we consider
the loss of a body part to be commensurable. Certainly the economic
costs of losing a body part, such as lost wages, are commensurable.
However, some argue that the intangible injuries to which the loss
gives rise, such as pain and suffering, are not commensurable. 121 If we
120. Weinrib states that the "equality consists in persons' having what lawfully belongs to
them." Weinrib, supra note 62, at 349. Equality does not consist in "an initial equality in the
parties' wealth." Id. at 354.
121. THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 48-49; see also Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37
UCLA L. REV. 785, 803-06 (1990) (arguing that intangible injuries such as pain and suffering
cannot be monetized); Margaret Jane Radin, Essay: Compensation and Commensurability, 43
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doubt the commensurability of these injuries, then we will have
difficulty concluding that compensation is restoration and, therefore,
122
that the wrong can be remedied.
According to Coleman, the remedy that corrective justice
prescribes is the "repair" by the wrongdoer of the "wrongful losses" for
which he is "responsible." 123 Coleman contemplates that repair will
occur through the provision of compensation for these losses. 124 Like
Weinrib, Coleman assumes that monetary compensation can remedy
wrongs. However, there is still a theoretical question whether
compensation actually can repair all losses.
Both Weinrib and Coleman presumably would consider
historical injustices remediable through cash compensation if
restitution of an object were not feasible or sufficient.1 25 Historical
injustices often involve violations of property rights and bodily
integrity similar to those encountered in tort law, which these
theorists argue instantiates corrective justice. If these theorists did
not regard violations of bodily integrity or property rights to be
remediable through compensation, then they could not argue that tort
law embodies corrective justice.
Matters become more complicated if we depart from the
assumption underlying Coleman's and Weinrib's theories that
violations of bodily integrity or property rights are commensurable. If
we doubt the commensurability of these violations, then we must
doubt whether they are remediable. Doubts about the remediability of
violations generate doubts about whether there is an Aristotelian
justification for repairing historical injustices.

DUKE L.J. 56, 69-70 (1993) (describing the traditional position that bodily harm and emotional
distress are non-commensurable); Bradford, supra note 39, at 64, 67, 83 (emphasizing that
injustices Native Americans have suffered cannot be redressed through cash compensation, but
rather require an elaborate program of land restitution, self-determination, and reconciliation).
122. See Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundationsof Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 457-61
(1992) (arguing that Aristotle's obligation of restoration "does not seem to apply where the
gainer's gain is not equal to the loser's loss"). But see Weinrib, supra note 62, at 354-55 (arguing
that restoration is possible even when the gain and loss are not co-extensive because equality
does not refer to wealth).
123. COLEMAN, supranote 62, at 329.
124. Id. at 371 ("Corrective justice imposes the duty on the wrongdoer to compensate his
victims for the costs his wrongdoing imposes on them.").
125. If an object is taken, returning it might not be sufficient to restore the equality between
wrongdoer and victim (or repair the victim) if the victim suffered harm while deprived of the
object. In this situation, restoring equality or repairing the victim might require compensating
the victim for the harm suffered while the object was out of her hands, or apologizing for the
taking of the object, in addition to restitution of the object. Janna Thompson, Collective
Responsibility for HistoricalInjustices, in JUSTICE IN TIME, supranote 14, at 101, 103.

160

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1:127

To recap, then, the Aristotelian duty of repair is an agentspecific duty, according to which a wrongdoer is obligated to his
victim. As discussed above, there are at least three conditions for
invoking that duty: the wrongdoer and victim must exist, the
wrongdoer must have violated a protected interest of the victim, and
that violation must be remediable. These requirements constrain the
extent to which the Aristotelian duty grounds claims for redress for
historical injustices in potentially significant ways.
B. Nozickian Corrective Justice
While corrective justice usually is conceived of in agent-specific,
Aristotelian terms, there are alternative conceptions of corrective
justice that impose general duties on society to repair past injustices.
Probably the most well-known agent-neutral theory of corrective
justice is Nozick's principle of rectification. 126 As mentioned above, it
has been invoked by proponents of redress for historical injustices in
127
the United States.
Nozick's principle of rectification is a component of his
historical entitlement theory of distributive justice. Presented as an
alternative to John Rawls's conception of distributive justice, 128 the
historical entitlement theory maintains that holdings are distributed
justly if they were acquired and transferred according to the proper
procedures. In particular, Nozick's procedural theory of distributive
justice dictates that holdings must be acquired and transferred
according to three principles. The first is the principle of justice in
acquisition, which governs how individuals may come to acquire
property in unowned things.1 29 The second is the principle of justice in
transfer, which governs the subsequent transfer of appropriated
things. 130 The principle of rectification is the third principle. It dictates
that holdings not acquired or transferred in accordance with the two
first principles must be assigned to the persons that would have been

126. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 152-53, 230-31 (1974). Another agentneutral theory of corrective justice is Jules Coleman's annulment theory, which he has
abandoned. COLEMAN, supra note 62, at 318.
Note that I am labeling Nozick's principle of rectification "corrective justice," but that he does
not describe the principle as a theory of corrective justice. See also Perry, supra note 56, at 254
(describing "Nozick's entitlement theory" as "in effect, a theory of corrective justice to which the
principle of justice in acquisition has been appended").
127. See supranote 77 and accompanying text.
128. NOZICK, supra note 126, at 198-204.
129. Id. at 150.
130. Id. at 150-51.
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entitled to them if the first two principles had been followed.13 1 Under
Nozick's entitlement theory, holdings are distributed justly if they are
distributed consistently with the principles of acquisition, transfer,
and rectification. 132
At first glance, Nozick's principle of rectification would seem to
be a much more attractive basis for claiming redress for a historical
injustice than the Aristotelian duty of repair because the principle is
not agent specific. Unlike Aristotle, Nozick does not ascribe
responsibility for rectification solely to the original wrongdoer.
Instead, he suggests that the obligation to rectify the violation of the
principle of justice in acquisition or transfer applies to society at
large. 133 Also unlike Aristotle, Nozick does not limit the right to
rectification to victims of the violation, implying instead that
rectification is a freestanding right. 13 4 The principle of rectification,
then, seems to ground claims for injustices that happened long ago,
potentially many years after the direct victims and wrongdoers have
passed away. Indeed, Nozick actually suggests that the principle of
rectification could ground claims to redress historical injustices. He
identifies slavery as an example of a violation of the principle of
1 35
justice in transfer for which rectification may be owed.
However, there still are limits on the circumstances in which
the principle of rectification can be invoked in support of claims for
redress. I discuss three conditions for invoking it: the violation-of-aprotected-interest requirement, the remediable-violation requirement,
and the consistency-with-the-proviso requirement.
1. Violation of Protected Interest
One condition for invoking the principle of rectification is that
the wrong for which redress is sought must be a violation of an
interest that rectification protects. Recall that the interests protected
under Aristotelian conceptions of corrective justice include, at a

131. Id. at 152-53, 230-31.
132. Id. at 150-53.
133. Id. at 231 ("[An important question for each society will be the following: given its
particular history, what operable rule of thumb best approximates the results of a detailed
application in that society of the principle of rectification?"); see also THOMPSON, supra note 14,
at 43 (suggesting that in Nozick's framework, "[t]he right of rectification ... [does] not depend on
the presence of the agents responsible for the violation").
134. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 102 (suggesting "descendants" or "successors" of
a direct victim may reclaim title). But see THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 40 (suggesting that
Nozick premises entitlement to rectification on a rights violation).
135. NOZICK, supra note 126, at 152.
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minimum, bodily integrity and core property rights. 136 The principle of
rectification also seems to protect at least these interests.
On its face, the principle of rectification protects against
violations of the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer. 137
What do these two principles protect? Nozick is largely silent on the
content of the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer, with one
notable exception that I discuss below (the proviso). 138 However,
Nozick does offer several examples of actions that violate the principle
of justice in transfer for which he implies rectification is required.
Specifically, in introducing the principle of rectification, he states:
Not all actual situations are generated in accordance with the two principles of justice in
holdings: the principle of justice in acquisition and the principle of justice in transfer.
Some people steal from others, or defraud them, or enslave them, seizing their product
and preventing them from living as they choose, or forcibly exclude others from
competing in exchanges. None of these are permissible modes of transition from one
situation to another. And some persons acquire holdings by means not sanctioned by the
principle of justice in acquisition. The existence of past injustice (previous violations of
the first two principles of justice in holdings) raises the third major topic under justice
in holdings: the rectification of injustice in holdings. 139

Based on the examples that Nozick offers, then, we can conclude that
the interests protected by the principle of rectification include bodily
integrity ("enslave them") and core property rights ("[s]ome people
steal from others, or defraud them").
As mentioned above, most historical injustices for which
redress has been sought can be framed as violations of bodily integrity
and/or core property rights. As a result, the requirement that the
injustice have violated an interest protected by the Nozickian
principle of rectification would not seem to pose an obstacle for using
the principle to ground many prominent claims for redress. Again,
because the principle of rectification is a moral principle with its own
internal logic, the fact that a violation may have been legal when it
was committed would not affect whether rectification is due.
2. Remediable Violation
A second condition for claiming redress based on the principle
of rectification is that the violation of the protected interest must be
capable of being rectified. This requirement is implicit in Nozick's
theory. After all, if the wrong cannot be rectified, there would be no
point in imposing an obligation to rectify it.
136. See supra Part III.A.2.
137. NOZICK, supra note 126, at 152-53.

138. Id. at 150.
139. Id. at 152.
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Nozick begins by suggesting that the objective of rectification is
transferring an asset to the party that would have held it but for the
historical violation of the principle(s) of justice in acquisition and/or
transfer.140 However, in a footnote to the suggestion, Nozick recognizes
that this objective might be hard to achieve.14 1 For example, it may be
difficult to determine counterfactually who might have held an object
if there had been no injustice, given the passage of time. 142 As a result,
Nozick proposes that rectification might be approximated by
implementing a legislated program distributing holdings in line with
Rawls's difference principle or some other principle, such as
equality.1 43 While I do not pursue it, there is, of course, an irony in
Nozick's proposal: having suggested that he is offering an alternative
to a patterned conception of distributive justice such as Rawls's, 44 he
offers a justification for a Rawlsian approach due to the difficulties of
actually implementing his historical entitlement theory. In the end,
then, his principle of rectification may not actually ground a claim to
redress a historic injustice if the claimant is not currently among the
14 5
most disadvantaged in society.
For present purposes, the key point to underscore is that
Nozick suggests two alternative objectives for rectification and,
therefore, two bases for assessing whether rectification is possible.
The first-best objective is transferring an improperly acquired or
transferred holding to the party that would have held it if there had
been no violation of justice in its acquisition or transfer.1 46 Under this
understanding of rectification, invoking the principle requires showing
that there remains a holding, that its rightful owner could be
identified, and that the holding could be transferred to this owner.
This is a stringent test that could make it difficult to use the principle
of rectification as a basis for claims to redress historical injustices. The
misappropriation of tangible objects or money potentially could be
rectified under this understanding of rectification. Assume there is a
holding (the object or money): it may be possible to identify who
should have it now, and the object or money could then be transferred.
But it is not clear that violations of bodily integrity could be rectified,
140. Id. at 152-53.
141. Id. at 153 n.*, 230-31.
142. See Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, supra note 14, at 7-14 (discussing
difficulties with counterfactual thinking).
143. NOZICK, supranote 126, at 153 n.*, 230-31.
144. Id. at 156-57.
145. Janna Thompson, Historical Injustice and Reparation: Justifying Claims of
Descendants, 112 ETHICS 114, 121 (2001).
146. See supratext accompanying note 140.
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given the difficulty of identifying a holding, the proper owner of it, and
effecting a transfer of that holding, if the proper owner could be found.
Under Nozick's second-best understanding of rectification, it is
accomplished through a societal scheme of distributive justice. Nozick
provides no definite guidance about the principles that should be used
in formulating this scheme. While raising Rawls's difference principle
and others as possibilities, he suggests that ultimately it is for "each
society" to determine what "operable rule of thumb best approximates
the results of a detailed application in that society of the principle of
rectification," given the society's "particular history." 147 This second
understanding of the principle of rectification gives considerably more
scope than Nozick's first for thinking that rectification of an injustice
might be possible. To say that an injustice is rectifiable under this
second understanding, it seems necessary to offer only a principled
distributive scheme that is responsive to the history of injustices in
the relevant society. The difficulty of devising and implementing such
a scheme should not be underestimated. But conceiving of rectification
in terms of a principled distributive scheme at least avoids the
minutiae of figuring out who would own what specific holdings now if
the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer had not been
violated in the past.
3. Proviso
At first glance, we might think that there is no time limit on
the principle of rectification. After all, as discussed above, the time
limit on the duty to repair in Aristotelian corrective justice is rooted in
its agent specificity, which requires an existing wrongdoer and an
existing victim.' 48 The principle of rectification does not require
continued existence because the principle contemplates a free-floating
duty and right not limited to the wrongdoer and the victim.
There is, however, a kind of time limit embedded in the
principle of rectification that comes from the principle of justice in
acquisition. While remaining largely silent on the principle of justice
in acquisition, Nozick underscores that the right to acquire unowned
objects is limited by a proviso, similar to the famous Lockean proviso.
According to the Nozickian proviso, accumulation of private holdings
is allowed provided that appropriation does not "worseno the situation

147. NOZICK, supranote 126, at 230-31.
148. See supra Part III.A.
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of others." 14 9 Before turning to the content of this proviso, we must
consider when it applies.
Clearly, the proviso applies at the point of initial appropriation.
An individual is not allowed to appropriate an unowned thing from the
150
wild if appropriation would worsen the situation of others.
Importantly, though, the proviso also continues to apply long after the
initial appropriation because it functions like a permanent servitude
on the holding. As Nozick explains:
Each owner's title to his holding includes the historical shadow of the Lockean proviso
on appropriation. This excludes his transferring it into an agglomeration that does
violate the Lockean proviso and excludes his using it in a way, in coordination with
others or independently of them, so as to violate
the proviso by making the situation of
151
others worse than their baseline situation.

While Nozick does not say so explicitly, the proviso also should be
regarded as limiting transfers to rectify past injustices, given its broad
applicability to subsequent transfers. If a rectificatory transfer would
worsen anyone's situation, then the rectification presumably would
not be justified under Nozick's entitlement theory. Indeed, Nozick
seems to raise implicitly the possibility that the proviso applies to
rectification when he asks rhetorically in discussing rectification,
"How far back must one go in wiping clean the historical slate of
152
injustices?"
As for the content of the proviso, the key issue always is
whether the appropriation or transfer would worsen the situation of
others. Nozick is elusive about what the baseline is for assessing
whether an appropriation or transfer worsens the situation of others.
But he seems to envision that the baseline is the situation in the state
of nature where something akin to common ownership prevails. 15 3 As
Nozick acknowledges, his baseline for comparison is "low. ' 154 The
appropriation must only not leave others worse off than they would be
in the state of nature. Nozick, then, can easily justify private property,
even if it generates massively unequal distributions of holdings.
Compared with the state of nature, private property generates many
benefits even for individuals who do not hold much property. For
example, private property "increases the social product by putting
means of production in the hands of those who can use them most
149.
doctrine
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

NOZICK, supra note 126, at 175. According to G.A. Cohen, the proviso "is Nozick's
of appropriation." G.A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY 76 (1995).
NOZICK, supra note 126, at 174-82.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 152.
COHEN, supra note 149, at 76-87.
NOZICK, supra note 126, at 181.
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efficiently (profitably)" and "enables people to decide on the.., risks
155
they wish to bear."
When might a transfer, in particular a rectificatory transfer,
worsen the situation of others? Again, the baseline for assessing the
effects of rectification, like initial appropriation, seems to be the
situation in the state of nature before private property. Thus, in
determining whether a rectificatory transfer would be unjustifiable
because it would violate the proviso, we must examine whether the
transfer would leave others worse off than they would be under
something like common ownership. It is likely that few rectificatory
transfers will violate Nozick's proviso. Even the people required to
finance reparations or restitution probably will not be left worse off
than they would have been in the state of nature.
Still, though, the existence of the proviso means that Nozick's
principle of rectification is subject to a kind of time limit that will
block transfers to original owners in extreme situations. Consider the
following scenario: Property initially was acquired without violating
the proviso, maybe because there were no other claimants around.
Subsequently, the property was transferred in violation of the
principle of justice in transfer. When rectification comes on the
agenda, however, circumstances may be drastically different. For
example, the population has expanded or resources have been
depleted to the point that returning the property to its original owner
would create shortages of land or other resources that would leave
many people thirstier or hungrier than they would be in the state of
nature. Because the proviso would limit rectificatory transfers in
extreme circumstances, the proviso imposes a time limit on
rectification. But this time limitation is impossible to specify in
advance because it is contingent on radical changes in circumstances.
Notably, in an influential series of articles, Jeremy Waldron
has developed further the idea underlying the proviso that property
rights are vulnerable to changes in circumstances. 1 56 Waldron's

155. Id. at 177.

156. Waldron's leading articles include Waldron, Superseding HistoricalInjustice, supra note
14, at 4-28, which develops his Supersession Thesis in analyzing aboriginal claims for redress;
Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, supra note 14, at 135-60, which further elaborates the
Supersession Thesis in the context of discussing aboriginal claims; and Waldron, Settlement,
Return, and the Supersession Thesis, supra note 14, at 237-68, which applies the Supersession
Thesis to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
The following comparison between Waldron's Supersession Thesis and the Nozickian proviso
is mine. Waldron addresses the relationship between the Supersession Thesis and the Nozickian
proviso only in passing. See Waldron, Settlement, Return, and the Supersession Thesis, supra
note 14, at 245 n.13 (distinguishing the Supersession Thesis from Nozick); Jeremy Waldron,
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Supersession Thesis, like Nozick's proviso, posits that changes in
circumstances may weaken property rights to the point that
rectification of unjust transfers is no longer justifiable. Importantly,
though, Waldron departs from Nozick in making the status quo, not
the state of nature, the baseline for assessing whether rectificatory
transfers are permissible. Under the Supersession Thesis, property
rights diminish, and may be eliminated, if changes in circumstances,
such as population growth or resource depletion, mean that enforcing
the rights would leave existing persons worse off than they are now.
In light of the way that Waldron redefines the baseline, redressing
historical injustices is much less likely to be justifiable under
57
Waldron's Supersession Thesis than under the Nozickian proviso.'
The implications of the Supersession Thesis are evident in
Waldron's treatment of specific claims for redress. Waldron developed
his Supersession Thesis in response to the demands of New Zealand
Maori for the return of land and other resources that had been taken
from them in violation of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. 158 Waldron
argues that while Maori had property rights in these resources when
the resources were wrongfully taken from Maori, those rights may not
survive in their original form. Waldron suggests that as a result of
changes in the interim, including substantial European settlement of
New Zealand, many people likely would be left worse off than they are
now if historical Maori rights were operable. 159 A similar argument
has been made regarding demands by Native Americans for lands

Nozick and Locke: Filling the Space of Rights, 22 SOC. PHIL. AND POLY 81, 98 n. 61 (2005)
(implying Supersession Thesis is related to Nozickian proviso).
157. See generally Waldron, Settlement, Return, and the Supersession Thesis, supra note 14,
at 240-43, 248-68 (emphasizing that property rights can fade over time as circumstances
change). While insisting that an unjust violation of property rights could be superseded by
subsequent changes in circumstances, Waldron emphasizes that he does not advocate forgetting
about the initial injustice, even if it is superseded. "Apologies and acknowledgments are properly
demanded, and at least symbolic compensation may be due to descendants of those who were
originally treated unjustly." Id. at 244. A remedy also might be due for the initial injustice. Id. at
242.
158. Waldron, Settlement, Return, and the Supersession Thesis, supra note 14, at 243-46.
Recently, Waldron applied the Supersession Thesis to territories Israel has occupied since 1967.
Id.
159. Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, supra note 14, at 26 (arguing that returning
land to New Zealand Maori today "might mean many people going hungry who might otherwise
be fed and many people living in poverty who might otherwise have an opportunity to make a
decent life"); see Waldron, Settlement, Return, and the Supersession Thesis, supra note 14, at 244
(arguing that in light of the changes in New Zealand since European colonization, "it boggles
belief to say that what justice requires in this territory now is anything like what justice
required at the very beginning of European contact"); id. at 255 (explaining that in New Zealand,
"the key change is the presence... of large numbers of people who had no practicable choice but
to remain").
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wrongfully taken from them. Without invoking the idea of
supersession, David Lyons has suggested that it would not be just to
return all of the tribes' lands to their descendants, even though the
lands were taken wrongfully from their ancestors, given the changes
60
that have occurred in the United States in the interim.
In summary, Nozick's principle of rectification does not provide
an unconstrained justification for redressing historical injustices. The
injustice must be a violation of a protected interest, and the violation
must be remediable. Moreover the proviso potentially imposes a time
limit on invoking the principle of rectification because it emphasizes
that entitlements are affected by circumstances.
Despite the conditions that must be satisfied to invoke Nozick's
principle of justification, I emphasize again that the Nozickian
principle likely justifies redressing historical injustices in more
circumstances than Aristotelian corrective justice. Consider the
following hypothetical as an illustration of a situation where the
Nozickian principle of rectification would support redress, while
Aristotelian corrective justice might not. Imagine that a Communist
government comes to power in a country. A month later, the
government seizes the land of a farmer without paying him
compensation because the farmer is from an ethnic minority. The
farmer (the direct victim), his daughter (the first descendant
generation, or GI), his grand-daughter (G2), and his great-granddaughter (G3) live out their days in a small town near the old family
farm, working first on collective farms and then in nearby factories
that are built as the country gradually industrializes under
Communism. After a century, a new government comes to power
through an election, not a revolution. For sentimental reasons, the
farmer's great-great-granddaughter (G4), who lives in a big city far
from the old farm, now wants to reclaim it. The farmland still is
owned by the state. The area surrounding the farm has not changed
much in the intervening century, although the population has declined
slightly because of the urbanization associated with the country's
industrialization.
160. Lyons, supra note 14, at 363, 375.
Without invoking Lyons or Waldron, courts recently have identified changes in
circumstances, including changes in demographics, as grounds for rejecting Native American
land claims in New York State. See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 277 (2d Cir.
2005) (holding that disruptive land claims are subject to equitable defenses); Shinnecock Indian
Nation v. New York, No. 05-CV-2887, 2006 WL 3501099, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006)
(discussing how a change in circumstances gives rise to equitable defenses). But see Oneida
Nation v. New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 128, 134-46 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing the possessory
land claims of three Oneida tribal groups because of the burdensome disruption that granting
such claims would cause, but allowing non-possessory claims for compensation to proceed).
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Nozick's principle of rectification is more likely to support
restoring the land to G4 than Aristotelian corrective justice. The
original taking violated an interest protected by both Nozickian and
Aristotelian corrective justice because the failure to pay compensation
breached a core property right. In addition, the violation is remediable
under both Nozickian and Aristotelian corrective justice through the
return of the land. The reason that the Nozickian principle supports
the return of the land to G4 while Aristotelian corrective justice might
not is Aristotelian corrective justice's agent specificity. The difficulty
G4 faces in claiming the farm under Aristotelian corrective justice is
that she is not the direct victim of the injustice or from the roughly
two generations of descendants that, as I suggested above, might be
able to claim repair under expansive interpretations of the existence
requirement without excessively diluting the concept of agent
specificity. Accordingly, the validity of G4's claim is doubtful under
Aristotelian corrective justice because there is no victim who has a
justifiable claim against the wrongdoer.161
In contrast, G4 has a justifiable claim under the Nozickian
principle of rectification because it contemplates a freestanding right
of repair. It does not require the continued existence of a victim or a
wrongdoer. As discussed above, in extreme cases, the proviso might
act as a time limit on repair similar to the Aristotelian existence
requirement. The proviso, however, is not triggered in the
hypothetical because there has been no change in circumstances since
the taking (such as a massive population increase) that would leave
people worse off if the land was returned than they would be in the
state of nature.
As the hypothetical illustrates, the Nozickian principle of
rectification potentially justifies redressing historical injustices many
years after they occurred when Aristotelian corrective justice might
not, provided there are no significant changes in circumstances that
would trigger the proviso blocking rectificatory transfers. However, as
the analysis of the hypothetical also illustrates, both Aristotelian and
Nozickian corrective justice are complex theories whose support for
redressing historical injustices is contingent on the circumstances of
the claim. As emphasized above, proponents of redress often overlook
this conditionality and its implications when they informally invoke
corrective justice in defense of repairing historical injustices.

161. Note that there is an existing wrongdoer a century after the injustice. The country's
government remains responsible for the actions of an earlier generation of officials because the
country did not dissolve.
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IV. CASE STUDY: REDRESSING CLAIMS AGAINST THE SwISS BANKS

Parts II and III had two main objectives: specifying the moral
arguments often used loosely in the United States to argue for
redressing historical injustices, and underscoring in largely theoretical
terms the difficulties with using these arguments to justify redress
claims. But it could be that in practice redress is an effective
deterrent, a successful mechanism for achieving distributive justice, or
defensible as corrective justice. This Part takes that possibility
seriously by examining whether one particular program being
implemented to redress historical injustices is justifiable as deterrence
or distributive or corrective justice: the program for redressing the
wrongs of the Swiss banks during and after World War II.
For decades, allegations persisted that the Swiss banks had
been the Third Reich's bankers and withheld the accounts of
Holocaust victims after the war. 162 However, these allegations only
drew widespread public attention in the 1990s. 16 3 Intriguing in their
own right, the bringing and the resolution of the claims against the
Swiss banks also are historically significant. The claims against the
Swiss banks were the first major claims for Holocaust restitution
pursued in the United States in the 1990s. After these claims were
publicized, claims were brought against other European firms and
governments for Holocaust restitution. 164 In addition, claims for
redress for other injustices, including other World War II era
injustices and African American slavery and Jim Crow, became more
165
prominent.
I begin by analyzing the banks' wrongs, efforts to force the
banks to redress them, and the implementation of the program of
restitution that resulted from this campaign. Then I argue that it is
possible to justify a significant portion of what has been done to
redress the wrongs of the Swiss banks, but not everything. Thus, the
Swiss banks case exemplifies the moral complexity of attempting to
redress clear wrongs many years after they occurred.

162. See infra text accompanying note 177.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 179-180.
164. See generally BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 1-306 (chronicling the emergence of claims for
Holocaust restitution in the 1990s).
165. Id. at 307-34 (chronicling emergence of claims for redressing other historical injustices
in the 1990s).
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A. Background
1. Historical Wrongs
The claims against the Swiss banks largely concerned their
conduct during and after World War II. Throughout the war, Swiss
banks acted as the Third Reich's main bankers. 166 While Switzerland
officially remained neutral during World War II, its central bank and
commercial banks, with government support, laundered some gold
that the Nazi regime plundered from individual Holocaust victims and
large amounts of gold looted by Nazi Germany from the central banks
of the countries the Reich invaded. 167 The Third Reich used funds from
these gold transactions to finance its war effort. 168 In addition, the
banks transferred assets belonging to the banks' Jewish account
holders to the Reich and its supporters. 169 In doing so, the banks
violated agreements with their customers, who, in many cases, had
entrusted assets to the banks for safekeeping in the lead-up to the
war. 170 During the war, Swiss banks also served many of the public
and private entities in Germany that used slave labor. As a result, the
71
banks may have profited from the use of slave labor.
After the war, the Swiss government and the Swiss banks
largely covered up their wartime actions. 72 Moreover, the private
Swiss banks that had taken deposits from Jews and others seeking to
166. OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, DEP'T OF STATE, PUBL'N 10468, U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO
RECOVER AND RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY GERMANY DURING
WORLD WAR II: PRELIMINARY STUDY iii, xxi (1997) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY STUDY].
167. INDEP. COMM'N OF EXPERTS SWITZ.-SECOND WORLD WAR, SWITZERLAND: NATIONAL
SOCIALISM AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR: FINAL REPORT 238-53, 265-72 (2002) [hereinafter
SWITZERLAND: FINAL REPORT]; PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 166, at ix, xxxi-xxxii, 40, 65, 166,

168 n.4, 178; Special Master's Proposed Plan of Allocation and Distribution of Settlement
Proceeds, at Annexes G-24 to -32, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig. (No. CV 96-4849) (Sept.
11, 2000), available at http://www.swissbankclaims.com/DistributionPlan.htm [hereinafter Plan
of Allocation].
"During the first years of the war, most of the German gold was sold to Swiss commercial
banks." SWITZERLAND: FINAL REPORT, supra, at 238. But later the Swiss requested that the
Reichsbank "deal with the" Swiss central bank, the Swiss National Bank). "From then on the
commercial banks only engaged in smaller-scale gold transactions abroad." Id. at 239.
168. SWITZERLAND: FINAL REPORT, supra note 167, at 247; PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note

166.
169. SWITZERLAND: FINAL REPORT, supra note 167, at 275-77, 456; INDEP. COMM. OF
EMINENT PERSONS, REPORT ON DORMANT ACCOUNTS OF VICTIMS OF NAZI PERSECUTION IN SWISS

BANKS 86-87 (1999) [hereinafter ICEP].
170. SWITZERLAND: FINAL REPORT, supra note 167, at 257-58, 261, 274-75.

171. Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at Annexes H-1 to -58, I-1 to -7; see also
SWITZERLAND: FINAL REPORT, supra note 167, at 311-18 (discussing the use of forced labor in
German subsidiaries of Swiss companies).
172. SWITZERLAND: FINAL REPORT, supra note 167, at 443, 445-46.
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safeguard them before the Holocaust did little to help the depositors'
descendants access the funds that the survivors badly needed. 173 In
response to periodic pressures from the relatives of persons murdered
in the Holocaust, the banks promised to search their records for
accounts that might have belonged to Holocaust victims. However, the
banks often employed narrow search criteria, producing little
information about the extent of dormant accounts in the banks'
possession. 174 Over the years, the banks also drained many dormant
accounts through fees and destroyed records that might have helped
identify the account holders and their descendants. 175 For the banks,
the funds in these accounts represented free working capital because
"unclaimed" bank accounts "do not escheat to the government" in
Switzerland.176
2. Process of Obtaining Redress
The wartime collaboration of the Swiss banks with the Third
Reich and their postwar withholding of Holocaust victims' accounts
were known immediately after the war. However, after the 1950s, the
wartime and postwar conduct of the Swiss banks largely faded from
view due to the western powers' focus on containing the Soviet
Union. 177 With the end of the Cold War, a series of forces made it
possible to revisit the injustices associated with the war.
The initial pressure on the Swiss banks to make redress came
from within Switzerland, after the Swiss President apologized for the
country's wartime mistreatment of Jewish refugees on the fiftieth
anniversary of the end of World War 11.178 Then, in 1995, leaders of
the Swiss Jewish community took a step that proved pivotal in
bringing the claims against the Swiss banks to broader attention: they
contacted Edgar Bronfman, chairman of the U.S.-based World Jewish

173. Id. at 277, 442-57.
174. Id. at 445-46, 451-57; ICEP, supra note 169, at 81, 87-97.
175. SWITZERLAND: FINAL REPORT, supra note 167, at 446-47, 455; ICEP, supra note 169, at
82, 84-86.
176. Memorandum, supranote 43, at 27 n.23.
Given that the banks continued to withhold accounts into the 1990s, the withholding could be
characterized as a continuing, rather than a historical, wrong. Edward R. Korman, Rewriting the
Holocaust History of the Swiss Banks: A Growing Scandal, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION, supra

note 43, at 115-32.
177. PRELIMINARY STUDY, supranote 166, at ix.
178. EIZENSTAT, supra note 42, at 48; GREGG J. RICKMAN, SwIss BANKS AND JEWISH SOULS

42-43 (2d prtg. 1999).
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Congress ("WJC"), and asked for his help in pursuing the banks. 179
Together with Rabbi Israel Singer, Bronfman had revitalized the WJC
in the 1980s. Under their leadership, the WJC participated in the Cold
War campaign to press the Soviet Union to allow Jews to emigrate
and drew attention to Austrian Chancellor Kurt Waldheim's Nazi
past. For the WJC, the misconduct of the Swiss banks represented
another instance of wartime collaboration and callous postwar
indifference to the plight of Holocaust victims by leading European
institutions. 18 0 Resolving the claims against the banks also stood to
help with a top priority of American Jewish social service agencies in
the 1990s: sustaining the hundreds of thousands of destitute elderly
Jews in the former Soviet Union who, in many cases, were double
victims of Nazism and Communism.1 8 ' Forcing the Swiss banks to
identify and disclose the Holocaust victims' accounts might uncover
heirless assets that could be used to assist elderly Jews in the former
Soviet Union.1 82 Notably, there was a precedent for using the heirless
assets of Holocaust victims to assist living Holocaust victims. In the
early 1950s, the state of Israel and the Conference on Jewish Material
Claims
Against Germany ("Claims Conference")
negotiated
reparations from West Germany partly on the bases that it would be
unfair for heirless Jewish properties to accrue to West Germany and
that there were many needy Jewish Holocaust survivors who could be
183
helped to resettle using proceeds from these properties.
179. RICKMAN, supra note 178, at 43. But see BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 11-12 (attributing
Bronfman's involvement to Rabbi Israel Singer's growing interest in the postwar activities of the
Swiss banks, and not mentioning the role of Swiss Jewish community leaders in bringing the
banks' conduct to Bronfman's attention).
180. JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIM'S FORTUNE: INSIDE THE EPIC BATTLE
OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST 5-13 (2002); BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 11-14; EIZENSTAT,

supra note 42, at 52-74. In 2007, Bronfman dismissed Singer from the World Jewish Congress
and Bronfman resigned as president of the organization. Stephanie Strom, President of Jewish
Congress Resigns After 3 Years' Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2007, at A16.
181. In 2003, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee ("JDC") described assisting
Jews in the former Soviet Union as "the Jewish world's largest relief operation in half a century."
AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2003) (on file with
Vanderbilt Law Review) [hereinafter JDC ANNUAL REPORT]. See generally ANITA WEINER,
RENEWAL: RECONNECTING SOVIET JEWRY TO THE JEWISH PEOPLE: A DECADE OF AMERICAN
JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE (AJJDC) ACTIVITIES IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

1988-1998, at 157-271 (Jacob Neusner ed., 2003) (discussing JDC relief and welfare activities in
the former Soviet Union).
182. When the banks, the WJC, and class action attorneys finally began negotiating
seriously to resolve the claims in 1997, Singer pressed for allocating heirless bank accounts to
Central and Eastern European and former Soviet Jewish communities. EIZENSTAT, supra note
42, at 119.
183. Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at 116-17 n.344, Annexes E-125 to -133; RONALD W.
ZWEIG, GERMAN REPARATIONS AND THE JEWISH WORLD: A HISTORY OF THE CLAIMS CONFERENCE
6-7 (1987).
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Starting in 1995, Bronfman drew on his political connections in
the United States to advance the claims against the banks.1 8 4 In
December of that year, Bronfman and Rabbi Singer met with
Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato of New York, then the Chairman
of the Senate Banking Committee. From April 1996 until D'Amato lost
his 1998 senatorial race, the Committee held a series of hearings on
the Swiss banks' behavior during and after the war. 8 5 Bronfman also
enlisted the support of the Clinton White House.18 6 The
Administration named Stuart Eizenstat as its designated point person
on the renewed efforts to achieve redress for Holocaust victims and,
their descendants. In this capacity, Eizenstat supervised the
production of two reports on the role of neutral countries, including
Switzerland, in laundering gold looted by the Nazis and on American
18 7
efforts to curtail and redress this laundering activity after the war.
Eizenstat also mediated negotiations between the Swiss banks and
other European interests that later were accused of profiting from the
Holocaust, representatives of Jewish communities around the world,
and class action attorneys.
Litigation also was used to obtain redress from the banks. In
particular, U.S. lawyers filed three federal class action suits between
October 1996 and January 1997 against Swiss banks. The bestresearched of these came from prominent class action attorneys
Michael Hausfeld and Melvyn Weiss, who took the case against the
Swiss banks pro bono. 8 8 Consolidated in the spring of 1997, the three
lawsuits used a variety of legal theories, including restitution, to claim
redress for the banks' wartime activities and the return of assets
184. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 13.

185. When Bronfman approached him, D'Amato immediately perceived the banks' conduct as
an issue that might help him with Jewish voters. Id. On the hearings, see, for example,
RICKMAN, supra note 178, at 51, 78, 85, 128, 171, 225.
186. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 14.
187. PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 166; OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, DEP'T OF STATE,
PUBL'N 10557, U.S. AND ALLIED WARTIME AND POSTWAR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH
ARGENTINA, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN, AND TURKEY ON LOOTED GOLD AND GERMAN EXTERNAL
ASSETS AND U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE FATE OF THE WARTIME USTASHA TREASURY (1998).
188. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 6-11; JANE SCHAPIRO,
HOLOCAUST AND THE SWISS BANKS 35-42 (2003).

INSIDE A CLASS ACTION:

THE

Attorneys' fees for the negotiation of the settlement accounted for a very low percentage of
the settlement in the Swiss banks case, partly because some plaintiff lawyers served pro bono.
However, some of the attorneys who worked pro bono in the Swiss banks case then went on to
earn sizeable fees in cases brought against other European firms for profiting from the
Holocaust. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 45-46. Recently, controversy has erupted over the fees that
attorney Burt Neuborne is seeking for work done at Judge Korman's request in administering
the settlement since it was negotiated. See In re Holocaust Victims Asset Litig., Nos. CV 060983(FB)(JO) et al., 2007 WL 4441189, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2007) (accepting magistrate
judge's recommendation of a $3,095,325 fee award to Professor Neuborne).
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deposited by Holocaust victims.18 9 Filing these class actions gave the
claimants additional leverage to force the banks to negotiate a
resolution of their claims and defined a set of players who would
negotiate the resolution-the class action attorneys, the WJC, and the
Swiss banks. Negotiations finally intensified in December 1997.190
Uncertain about whether the judge presiding over the class actions
would allow the legal claims against the banks to proceed, the banks,
the class action attorneys, and the WJC sat down to negotiate a
settlement with the assistance of Stuart Eizenstat. 19 1 As they did so,
local and state public finance officials led by New York City
Comptroller Alan Hevesi provided the claimants with economic
leverage. 192 The officials threatened to sanction the Swiss banks if
they did not resolve the claims, using as a model the sanctions that
many governments had applied against apartheid South Africa in the
1980s.193
Ultimately, after more than seven months of negotiations, the
WJC and the class action attorneys settled the claims against the
banks just before local- and state-government-sponsored sanctions
were to take effect in New York. The $1.25 billion settlement was
announced in August 1998 on the steps of the courthouse where Judge
Edward Korman presides, reflecting his role in bringing the parties
together. 194
3. Implementation of Redress
The centerpiece of redress in the Swiss banks case has been the
distribution of the $1.25 billion settlement paid by two private Swiss
banks, Credit Suisse and UBS AG. 195 Unlike many other class action
settlements, the plaintiff and defendant attorneys did not attempt to
negotiate the allocation of the settlement of the claims against the
Swiss banks. 196 Instead, the settlement agreement assigned the tasks
189. Memorandum, supra note 43, passim.
190. See, e.g., EIZENSTAT, supra note 42, at 114-76 (chronicling the negotiation of a
settlement in the Swiss banks case).
191. Id.
192. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 21-25.
193. RICKMAN, supra note 178, at 189-90, 199, 226.
194. Id. at 230; BAZYLER, supranote 2, at 27-29.
195. Joseph P. Fried, Swiss Banks Reach Holocaust Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1998, at
Ai; In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
196. See Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 287, 316-17 n.127 (2003) (noting that class and defense counsel usually bargain allocation).
Having agreed to pay $1.25 billion, the banks had little interest in participating in what
would surely be a contentious process. Similarly, there was little incentive for plaintiffs'
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of allocating and distributing the $1.25 billion to Judge Korman. He
has been doing so with the assistance of Special Master Judah
Gribetz, an attorney with considerable political experience and
197
knowledge of the inner workings of the Jewish philanthropic world.
As of December 2007, well over half of the Swiss banks
settlement fund had been disbursed. Judge Korman has indicated that
he will distribute the remainder of the settlement fund once the
process of identifying bank accounts belonging to depositors and their
heirs is complete. 198 Table 1 identifies how the settlement funds have
been allocated among the five settlement classes that Judge Korman
certified, along with other uses.
As Table 1 illustrates, the bulk of the settlement funds have
been distributed to four groups' 99 : the Deposited Assets Class (48% of
settlement funds), former slave laborers (29%), the Looted Assets
Class (21%), and the Refugee Class (1.2%). The Deposited Assets Class
mainly comprises the heirs (or heirs of heirs) of Jewish Holocaust
victims who deposited funds with Swiss banks before World War II.
Former slave laborers are those individuals who provided slave labor
to German or Swiss firms in Germany that may have used Swiss
banks during World War II. The Looted Assets Class comprises the
victims and targets of Nazi persecution whose property was looted by
the Nazis and potentially laundered through the Swiss banks, as well
as the heirs of these victims and targets.2 0 0 Instead of ordering small
payments to the many class members, Judge Korman has distributed
most of the funds set aside for the Looted Assets Class to a small
attorneys to negotiate the allocation since many had accepted strict limits on their fees. See
supra note 188 (describing limits on attorneys' fees). Moreover, the plaintiffs' attorneys feared
that if they attempted to allocate the funds, unseemly fights would erupt among different groups
of Holocaust victims. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., No. CV-96-4849-ERK-MDG, 2000 WL
33241660, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000).
197. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 150. All appeals of Judge
Korman's decisions allocating the settlement fund have been dismissed. See In re Holocaust
Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d
158 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2005); In re
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 413 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2001).
198. Claims Resolution Tribunal, Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (Swiss Banks),
Introduction to the Claims Resolution Process, http://www.crt-ii.org/introduction.phtm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2007).
199. For a description of the four groups, see infra text accompanying notes 207-214.
200. A Victim or Target of Nazi Persecution is defined in the settlement agreement as "any
individual, corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, unincorporated association, community,
congregation, group, organization, or other entity persecuted or targeted for persecution by the
Nazi Regime because they were or were believed to be Jewish, Romani, Jehovah's Witness,
homosexual, or physically or mentally disabled or handicapped." Exhibit 1 to Plan of Allocation,
Class Action Settlement Agreement § 1, http://www.swissbankclaims.comPDFsEng/
exhibitltoPlanofAllocation.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
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number of non-profit organizations to be used to assist the neediest
Holocaust survivors. 2 1 In particular, a large share of Looted Asset
Class funds has been distributed to two Jewish philanthropic
organizations, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
("JDC") and the Claims Conference, to assist needy elderly Jews in the
former Soviet Union. 20 2 The Refugee Class is comprised of individuals
denied entry into Switzerland as refugees during World War II and of
those who entered Switzerland and were mistreated. 20 3 Although the
Swiss government, not the Swiss banks, was responsible for the
country's wartime refugee policies, the Swiss banks sought and
obtained a release of claims against the government through the
204
settlement.
As a result of Judge Korman's allocation decisions,
approximately 51% of the settlement funds disbursed to date have
been received by direct victims of World War II, while 48% have been
20 5
received by heirs (or heirs of heirs) of Holocaust victims.

201. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 302 F. Supp. 2d 89, 95-107 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Plan of
Allocation, supra note 167, at 23.
202. See infra notes 212-213 and accompanying text (showing distribution of funds).
203. Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at Annexes J-1 to -31 (describing Swiss wartime
refugee policies).
204. Exhibit 1 to Plan of Allocation, supra note 200, at Class Action Settlement Agreement §
12; gee Swift, supra note 43, at 54 ("The Swiss banks insisted on closure for themselves and all
Swiss entities-an unprecedented nationwide release for any type of Holocaust-era claim.").
205. These estimates of the shares allocated to direct victims and heirs assume that (1) all
funds paid to the slave labor, refugee and looted assets classes went to direct victims; and (2) all
funds paid to the deposited assets class and insurance awards went to heirs (or heirs of heirs).
They do not take into account administrative and other expenses.
Special Master Gribetz has recommended that once the search for bank accounts is complete,
the money remaining in the settlement fund be distributed largely to the most economically
needy survivors, just as funds allocated to the Looted Assets Class have been used for
humanitarian assistance. Special Master's Recommendations for Allocation of Possible
Unclaimed Residual Funds, at 11-12, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., No. CV 96-4849 (Apr.
16, 2004), available at http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Overview.aspx (go to "the Special
Master's Recommendations for Allocation of Possible Unclaimed Residual Funds" link).
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Table 1: Allocation of Swiss banks settlement fund as of December 2007206
Class

Amount
Received

Recipients

Description of
Disbursement

Deposited
Assets
Class

$469,060,657

Mainly heirs (or heirs of heirs) of
the original bank account
depositors because most of the
original depositors
were murdered
20 7
in the Holocaust

Individually calculated
payments reflecting
account values

Slave
Labor I
Class

$287,162,350

Former slave laborers who worked
for German organizations tied to
208
Swiss entities

Each former slave
laborer receives $1,450209

Slave
Labor II
Class

$826,500

Former slave laborers who worked
210
for Swiss corporations

Each former slave
laborer receives $1,450211

Looted
Assets
Class

$205,000,000

JDC, Claims Conference, and
International Organization for
Migration 212

Most funds have been
used to distribute food
packages, medical help,
and other assistance to
needy elderly Jewish
Holocaust survivors in
the former Soviet
2
Union 13

Refugee
Class

$11,600,000

Refugees denied entry to
Switzerland or refugees who were
admitted and mistreated

Individuals denied entry
receive $3,625.
Individuals admitted and
mistreated receive
$725214

206. See Swiss Banks Settlement Fund Distribution Statistics as of December 31, 2007,
[hereinafter
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/DocumentsNew/Scanjob-20080109-155313.pdf
Statistics] (last visited Jan. 10, 2008).
The overall size of the settlement fund available for distribution exceeds $1.25 billion, partly
because the banks paid compound interest. Lead Settlement Counsel's Brief Opposing the
Holocaust Survivors Foundation USA, Inc.'s Opposition to the District Court's Allocation of the
Settlement Fund, at 20-21, Pink Triangle Coalition v. Union Bank of Switz., No. 04-1899(CON)CV (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2004) (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
207. Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at 10-11.
208. Id. at Annexes H-1 to -2, H-52 to -58.
209. Statistics, supra note 206.
210. Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at Annex I-1.
211. Statistics, supra note 206.
212. Id.
213. Id. at n.2; In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 302 F. Supp. 2d 89, 102-03 (E.D.N.Y.
2004).
214. Statistics, supra note 206.
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Class

Amount
Received

Recipients

Description of
Disbursement

Victim List
Project

$10,000,000

Yad Vashem Holocaust Martyrs'
and Heroes' Remembrance
Authority in Israel, U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum

Program is intended "to
collect and make widely
available the names of
all victims or targets of
215
Nazi persecution"

Incentive
Awards

$575,000

"[S]even class members whom the
Court determined provided 'efforts
[which] materially aided the
plaintiff class' "216

Transferred by court

Insurance
Awards

$1,024,480

Owners or heirs of insurance
policies issued by selected Swiss
insurance companies before and
during World War 11217

Transferred by court, but
paid 50-50 by settlement
fund and insurance
218
company

Total

$985,248,987

B. Moral Justifiabilityof Redress
I now consider whether the redress program implemented in
the Swiss banks case can be justified using the moral arguments for
redress identified in Parts II and III. I argue that it is difficult to
justify the redress program as a deterrent or as distributive justice.
However, I suggest that part of the program-the payments for
withheld bank accounts-likely is justifiable as Aristotelian and
Nozickian corrective justice. Other parts of the program, though, are
difficult to justify as instantiating either form of corrective justice. As
a result, the Swiss banks case illustrates the moral complexity of
219
redress for historical injustices.
1. Deterrence
As mentioned above, one of the justifications given for suing
the Swiss banks and other corporations that profited from the
Holocaust in the 1990s was that it might deter the commission of

215. Id. at n.5.
216. Id. at n.4.
217. Id. at n.3.
218. Exhibit 1 to Plan of Allocation, supra note 200, at Amendment No. 2 to Settlement
Agreement, at 9.
219. Nothing in this Article should be interpreted as questioning the legality of any aspect of
the Swiss banks' redress program. It clearly is being administered lawfully by Judge Korman.
Nor should I be interpreted as questioning the motives of the individuals who sought redress
from the banks or the individuals who are implementing the redress program. I admire their
work, and recognize that it often has been conducted in difficult circumstances.
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similar wrongs in the future. 220 Consistent with my earlier discussion
of redress's potential to deter, I begin by considering whether the
redress program is justified as a form of individual deterrence. The
argument here would be that forcing the banks to pay redress will
deter them from committing wrongs that are the same as the ones
they redressed. To assess whether the settlement has deterred the
banks from doing so, we might consider their conduct since the
settlement. In particular, we might try to assess whether they have
demonstrated a new aversion to participating in the commission of
human rights violations. But this kind of assessment is difficult to
make from the outside. While much has been written about the banks'
wartime and postwar conduct and the lawsuits against them,
relatively little has been written about how paying restitution has
affected the banks going forward.
There is anecdotal evidence that the affair has had some
impact on the Swiss banks. For example, as a result of the
controversy, the Swiss Bankers Association developed new guidelines
for managing dormant accounts that could help the banks avoid
221
accumulating dormant accounts like those of Holocaust victims.
More relevant to our interest in the banks' post-settlement approach
to human rights, one participant in the negotiation of the settlement,
Stuart Eizenstat, has suggested that the controversy has made the
banks more sensitive to human rights. Writing in the early 2000s,
Eizenstat argued that "[t]o help repair the tainted reputation of their
banks, the Swiss have now become active leaders in international
anti-money-laundering efforts; they have been freezing accounts of
dictators like Nigerian strongman Sani Abacha and cooperating with
222
the Bush administration's efforts to block assets of terrorists."
However, when asked to comment on Eizenstat's observations, the
Swiss Bankers Association denied that the banks' actions concerning
Sani Abacha, money laundering, or terrorism were related to the
223
controversy about the banks and the Holocaust.
220. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
221. Swiss BANKERS ASS'N, GUIDELINES OF THE SwIss BANKERS ASSOCIATION ON THE
TREATMENT OF DORMANT ACCOUNTS, CUSTODY ACCOUNTS AND SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES HELD IN
Swiss BANKS (REPLACES THE GUIDELINES DRAFTED 8TH SEPTEMBER 1995) 1, 1-12 (2000),

available at http://www.swissbanking.org/enl14_e.pdf;
see also COMM'N FtDtRALE DES
BANQUES,
RAPPORT
DE GESTION
CFB 2005,
at 33-35
(2005),
available at
http://www.ebk.admin.ch/f/publik/ bericht/pdfljb05.pdf (discussing a legislative proposal to
regulate dormant accounts).
222. EIZENSTAT, supra note 42, at 185. His reference to "the Swiss" suggests Eizenstat is not
commenting on the post-settlement conduct of the banks alone, but also of others in Switzerland.
223. E-mail from James Nason, Head of Int'l Commc'ns, Swiss Bankers Ass'n, to author
(June 27, 2006) (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
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Next, I consider whether the settlement has acted as a general
deterrent. As mentioned above, some of those who sued the banks
argued that holding them accountable might deter other private actors
from profiting from human rights violations. Because the case against
the banks was settled, it did not help to establish that private actors
could be held legally responsible for profiting from human rights
violations. Nonetheless, the settlement still might have deterred other
private actors from profiting from human rights violations in the way
that the Swiss banks did by acting as the Third Reich's bankers.
Notably, the Swiss banks case, along with the other Holocaust-related
litigation of the 1990s and early 2000s, generated settlements totaling
more than $7.5 billion, an "unprecedented" amount "in the human
rights field." 224 However, it is even harder to assess whether the
settlement has been a general deterrent than whether it has increased
the banks' sensitivity to human rights. The range of actors whose
behavior would have to be tracked is daunting: private firms, large
and small, in Switzerland and outside.
Without more information, then, it is difficult to justify the
Swiss banks settlement as a deterrent. Even if it could be proven that
the settlement had deterred the banks or other firms from profiting
from human rights violations, we still would need to ask from a
utilitarian perspective whether forcing the banks to make redress was
an efficient way of achieving this result. One consideration that would
have to be factored into that analysis is the unsavory anti-American
and anti-Semitic backlash in Switzerland following the efforts to
obtain redress. There the campaign against the banks was widely
perceived as an unfair attack on Swiss institutions by powerful Jewish
interests in the United States. 225 While that perception may not be a
reason not to have pursued the banks, 226 it nonetheless would have to
be considered in assessing the consequences of forcing the banks to
make redress.
2. Distributive Justice
Unlike redress for African Americans and Native Americans,
the campaign for redress from the Swiss banks was never promoted as
a way of achieving a more equal or need-sensitive distribution of
resources. However, as mentioned above, some of those who led the
224. Swift, supra note 43, at 58; see also EIZENSTAT, supra note 42, at 353-54 (describing the
successes of the reparations movement).
225. EIZENSTAT, supra note 42, at 184-86, 340, 348-50.
226. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 43, at 828 n.118 (arguing that backlash is not a reason
not to pursue the banks).
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campaign for redress seem to have been motivated partly by a desire
to help a particularly needy population of elderly Jews in the former
Soviet Union. In fact, in distributing the settlement fund, Judge
Korman has allocated a significant share of Looted Assets Class funds
to assist needy elderly Jewish Holocaust survivors in the former
Soviet Union. 22 7 Nonetheless, for at least two reasons, it is difficult to
justify the Swiss banks settlement as a whole, as promoting a more
just distribution of resources, in the sense of a distribution that is
more equal or favorable to the needy.
First, the overarching objective of the redress program has
been to redress the wrongs of the Swiss banks that harmed Holocaust
victims and their descendants. This focus on Holocaust victims and
their descendants is reflected in who has received settlement funds to
date. As mentioned above, 51% of funds allocated to date have gone to
direct victims, and 48% have been distributed to the heirs of
victims. 228 This focus on Holocaust victims and heirs who, for the most
part, have injuries traceable to the conduct of the banks is natural,
given the impetus for the demands for redress. But the focus on
Holocaust victims and their heirs also means that the redress program
is not a general scheme for equalizing holdings or addressing the
needs of the least well-off, irrespective of where they live and their
individual historical experiences.
A second reason why the redress program cannot be justified as
promoting distributive justice is that the $1.25 billion settlement has
not been distributed among Holocaust victims and heirs based on their
relative levels of need or their unequal circumstances. Instead, the
settlement fund has been distributed according to various criteria, of
which relative need has been only one factor. Perhaps the most
important decision that Judge Korman made in initially allocating the
fund was giving the claims for the return of bank accounts priority
over all other claims. To implement that decision, Judge Korman
reserved $800 million to pay the members of the Deposited Assets
Class, based on a very rough estimate of the current value of victim
assets that the banks might be found to hold. 229 A major reason why a
significant portion of the Swiss banks settlement fund remains

227. Approximately 14% of all settlement funds distributed to date have gone to social
service agencies to assist needy elderly Jewish Holocaust survivors in the former Soviet Union
($138,375,000/$985,248,987). See supra note 213 and accompanying table.
228. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
229. Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at 15. The priority given to the Deposited Assets
Class reflects Judge Korman's belief that the Class had the strongest legal claims against the
Swiss banks. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 302 F. Supp. 2d 89, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). It also
reflects the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at 11-15.
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unallocated is that Judge Korman has refused to distribute any
portion of the $800 million that has not yet been paid to the heirs of
depositors, pending a final determination that it is not possible to
match any more bank accounts to Holocaust victims. This matching
process has been time consuming, partly because the Swiss banks
230
destroyed many documents in the decades after the war.
In addition to his decision to reserve a significant share of the
settlement fund for the payment of bank account claims, Judge
Korman has made other decisions that underscore the fundamentally
backward-looking focus of the redress program. For instance, as Table
1 indicates, after the bank account claims, the second largest
allocation has gone to former slave laborers who were forced to work
for either Swiss-owned or German-owned companies that, in many
cases, used the Swiss banks.
As Table 1 also indicates, the third largest allocation, $205
million, has gone to the Looted Assets Class. In distributing this sum,
Judge Korman has considered need. But even the distribution within
the Looted Assets Class has not been based entirely on need. To start,
Judge Korman divided the $205 million allocated to this class between
Jewish and non-Jewish Holocaust victims: 90% has been used to assist
Jewish survivors ($184.5 million) and 10% to assist needy Roma,
Jehovah's Witness, disabled, and homosexual survivors ($20.5
million). 231 Then Judge Korman used relative levels of current need to
allocate the $184.5 million reserved for needy Jewish Holocaust
survivors. In allocating this sum, Judge Korman considered all needy
Jewish Holocaust survivors around the world as a single group. He
then allocated 75% of the $184.5 million ($138.375 million) to assist
elderly Jewish Holocaust survivors in the former Soviet Union because
they have the greatest need of any population of Jewish Holocaust
survivors, due to the combined legacy of Nazism and Communism, the
limited social safety net in the former Soviet Union, and the fact that
West Germany never paid restitution or reparations to Jewish
survivors in the area during the Cold War. The remaining 25%
($46.125 million) was allocated to assist needy Jewish Holocaust
survivors in other parts of the world, including the United States. 232
230. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 319 F. Supp. 2d 301, 314-21 (E.D.N.Y. 2004);
EIZENSTAT, supra note 42, at 94-98; Korman, supra note 176, at 126-29.
231. The 90/10 allocation was based on precedents for allocating funds between Jewish and
non-Jewish Holocaust survivors "dating back to 1945" and the fact that "Jewish victims now
constitute the overwhelming proportion of surviving 'Victims or Targets of Nazi Persecution' as
defined under the Settlement Agreement." Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at 118-19.
232. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2005); In re
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 302 F. Supp. 2d 89, 97-108 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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Not surprisingly, the large share of the Looted Assets Class
funds allocated to assist needy Jewish Holocaust survivors in the
former Soviet Union attracted the ire of some American Holocaust
survivors. They argued that Judge Korman's allocation shortchanged
needy Holocaust
survivors in the United States. While
"[a]pproximately 4% of the funds from the Looted Assets Class has
been allocated to needy survivors in the United States," 14%-19% of
the worldwide population of Jewish survivors lives in the United
States. 33 By comparison, the Jewish survivors in the former Soviet
Union who have received roughly 67.5% of Looted Assets funds
constitute "approximately 19%-27%" of the worldwide population of
Jewish survivors. 23 4 Incensed, some American Holocaust survivors
235
unsuccessfully appealed the allocation to the Second Circuit.
Amid the dispute over how to allocate the funds assigned to the
Looted Assets Class based on current need, it is important not to lose
sight of the limited role that need has played in the overall
distribution of the settlement fund. This is not surprising given the
wrongs that provided the basis for the settlement. Indeed, it seems
odd even to attempt to justify the distribution from the standpoint of
distributive justice, given the mainly backward-looking impetus for
the redress program.
3. Corrective Justice
I now consider whether the redress program is justified as
Aristotelian or Nozickian corrective justice. In discussing these
potential justifications, I divide the wrongs that the program has been
addressing into two categories: conversion of the bank accounts and
other wrongs (laundering by Swiss entities of looted assets, Swiss
entities' profits from use of slave labor in Germany, and the Swiss
government's wartime refugee policies). There is a strong argument
that redress for the conversion of the bank accounts is justified as
Aristotelian and Nozickian corrective justice. It is harder to justify the
redress undertaken for the other wrongs as either form of corrective
justice.

233. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 302 F. Supp. 2d at 97.
234. Id.
235. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 132. The Second Circuit's decision
upholding Judge Korman's allocation of a large share of the Looted Assets Class funds to
survivors in the former Soviet Union has not ended the criticism of the allocation. See, e.g.,
Thane Rosenbaum, Op-Ed., Losing Count, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, at A31 (arguing that
Judge Korman's allocation "diverted" assets that belonged to American survivors).
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As discussed above, Aristotelian corrective justice imposes an
obligation on wrongdoers to redress the victims of their wrongs. 236 At
least three conditions must be satisfied to justify redress as
Aristotelian corrective justice: (1) the wrongdoer and the victim must
exist because the wrongdoer must provide redress to his victim; (2) the
wrong for which redress is being provided must have been a violation
of a protected interest; and (3) it must be possible to view the redress
provided as remedying that wrong.
i. Conversion of Bank Accounts
As mentioned above, the largest share of the settlement fund
distributed to date (48%) has been paid to individuals claiming the
proceeds of Swiss bank accounts. At least some of these payments
would appear to be justifiable as an exercise in Aristotelian corrective
justice.
To begin, many of the bank account payments can be
understood as being made by wrongdoers to victims of their
misconduct. The two banks that paid the $1.25 billion, Credit Suisse
and UBS, probably wrongfully withheld many of the accounts now
being paid out of the settlement fund. Indeed, "87 percent of the
accounts identified by the Volcker Committee as probably or possibly
belonging to Jews were held" by Credit Suisse and UBS. 2 37 In
addition, "these two banks," which were operating in the 1930s and
1940s, "through acquisitions and mergers now contain more than 40
percent of all bank accounts open or opened in Switzerland during the
Nazi era."2 38 Because Credit Suisse and UBS (or banks that they
acquired and merged with) were the principal wrongdoers, it is
consistent with the agent specificity of Aristotelian corrective justice
239
for these two banks to be funding the payments for bank accounts.
236. See supra Part III.A.
237. Korman, supra note 176, at 118. The Volcker Committee, formally the Independent
Committee of Eminent Persons, was established in 1996 by the Swiss Bankers Association, the
World Jewish Restitution Organization, and the World Jewish Congress to identify accounts of
Holocaust victims in Swiss banks, and "to assess the treatment of the accounts of' Holocaust
victims by the banks. ICEP, supra note 169, at 1-2. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul
Volcker chaired the Committee.
238. Korman, supra note 176, at 118.
239. For some Aristotelians, the fact that victims of the banks' withholding are not being
paid by the actual banks that withheld the accounts, but rather by a settlement fund under the
supervision of Judge Korman, may be inconsistent with the Aristotelian ideal whereby the
wrongdoer repairs its own victims. But it is not clear that the administrative process through
which bank account claims are being paid removes the claims from the realm of corrective
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On the recipient side, most of the individuals who have
received payments for bank account claims likely are heirs-or heirs
of heirs-of the original depositors. The original depositors, while
eligible to receive payments, mostly were murdered in the
240
Holocaust.
From a strict Aristotelian perspective, it is problematic that
heirs (and heirs of heirs) are receiving payments from the dormant
accounts. As discussed above, under a strict interpretation of the
existence requirement central to Aristotelian corrective justice, only
the direct victims of the injustice are entitled to repair. In the Swiss
banks case, the original depositors, not their heirs, are the direct
victims of the banks' misconduct. That is because the banks' refusal to
pay out accounts after World War II violated understandings that the
depositors had with the banks.
However, we can reconcile the intuition that many people
probably have that the heirs are entitled to the bank account
payments with Aristotelian corrective justice by interpreting the
existence requirement generously. As a historical matter, many of the
Holocaust victims who deposited funds in Swiss banks before World
War II did so to provide for family members in the event of war or
other danger. 24 1 As a result, in withholding the accounts after the war,
the banks deprived heirs of funds that depositors had set aside for
them. Against this historical backdrop, the payments to heirs seem
consistent with the expansive interpretations of the existence
requirement discussed in Part III.A.1. First, if the dead can be
benefited, then the dead can be regarded as victims who are being
benefited through the payments to family members for whom they
deposited funds with Swiss banks. Alternatively, the payments to
heirs are justifiable as payments to victims on the basis that the heirs
themselves were victims of the banks' withholding of the accounts. By
paying the heirs now, the settlement fund is providing the heirs with

justice, especially given that the two banks that paid the settlement fund likely were
significantly responsible for the withholding of accounts. See COLEMAN, supra note 62, at 327
(arguing that while the wrongdoer has the duty of repair, it is consistent with corrective justice
for a third party to make the repair for the wrongdoer voluntarily).
A second wrinkle in the Swiss banks case for Aristotelians is that, while only UBS and Credit
Suisse paid the settlement, settlement funds are being used to pay out claims for bank accounts
withheld by other banks. Swift, supra note 43, at 58 (indicating that claims against "over 125
banks" are covered by the settlement).
240. Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at 11.
241. SWITZERLAND: FINAL REPORT, supra note 167, at 257-58, 261, 274-75.
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funds that they would have received immediately after the war had
242
the bank accounts not been wrongfully withheld.
The bank account payments also satisfy the second
requirement for Aristotelian corrective justice, which stipulates that
the payments must be for a violation of a protected interest. The
banks' withholding of the accounts after the war violated core property
rights of the depositors and their heirs. By withholding the accounts,
243
the banks improperly converted the accounts for their own use.
Finally, the payments for the bank account claims satisfy the
third requirement: that redress remedy the original wrong. The
payments come as close as is possible more than sixty years after
World War II to remedying the wrongful withholding of the accounts,
whether redress is understood as the restoration of equality or the
repair of wrongful losses. The Swiss banks program has devoted
considerable time and resources to calculating payments individually
in respect of bank account claims. The program's objective has been to
pay successful claimants the value of their-or their forebears'accounts, adjusted for inflation. 244 This objective has been met only
imperfectly, due to the banks' destruction of records in the decades
after the war and uneven cooperation from the banks in administering
the claims process. 245 But even the presumptions that have been
employed to compensate for the disappearance of documentary
246
evidence have been calculated, and are being scrutinized, with care.
Overall, then, there is a strong basis for justifying as Aristotelian
corrective justice at least the bank account payments to the heirs of
individuals murdered in the Holocaust.
242. As Janna Thompson states in a context unrelated to the Swiss banks case: "It would be
mean-minded to question the claims of descendants of Nazi victims on the grounds that their
parents or grandparents might have lost their possessions in some other way if the Nazis had not
stolen them." THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 123.
Notably, in the 1990s, the advocates of redress often highlighted the experiences of the
individuals who, I argue, had the strongest claims: individuals who were alive after World War
II who tried to claim bank accounts immediately after the war that their parents, or other
relatives, had set aside in the 1930s. See, e.g., RICKMAN, supra note 178, at 79 (describing the
choice of witnesses for the October 1996 Senate Banking Committee hearing).
243. Conversion was among the plaintiffs' causes of action. Memorandum, supra note 43, at
14 n.12.
244. Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (Swiss Banks), Deposited Assets Class,
http://www.swissbankclaims.com/DepositedAssets.aspx (last visited Dec. 25, 2007) (describing
the process for identifying bank account claimants, matching claimants to accounts, and
calculating account values).
245. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 319 F. Supp. 2d 301, 314-21 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(describing Swiss banks' destruction of documents).
246. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 319 F. Supp. 2d at 316-21; Rules Governing the
Claims Resolution Process (As Amended) at 17, available at http://www.crt-ii.org/_pdf/
governing-rules en.pdf (last visited Dec. 25, 2007).
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ii. Other Wrongs
To date, 51% of the settlement fund has been allocated to
individuals with no claims to Swiss bank accounts. 24 7 The recipients of
this 51% include slave laborers forced to work during World War II for
Swiss- and German-owned firms that, in many cases, used Swiss
banks; individuals who were denied entry to Switzerland as refugees,
and individuals who were admitted but mistreated; and social service
agencies assisting needy Holocaust survivors ("social service
agencies"). These various payments are hard to justify by appealing to
Aristotelian corrective justice.
To start, the payments to slave laborers, refugees, and social
service agencies do not fit the Aristotelian ideal, according to which
the wrongdoer is supposed to make a transfer to his victims. In
defense of these payments, it should be emphasized that they are
largely being made to victims of World War II, as an Aristotelian
would insist. Former slave laborers and refugees are the primary
recipients of payments for slave labor and the mistreatment of
refugees. Heirs of slave laborers and refugees can receive payments
only if the slave laborers and refugees died after the formalization of
the settlement in 1999.248 Similarly, the social service agencies
receiving funds set aside for the Looted Assets Class must spend these
funds to assist only needy Holocaust survivors. 249 One consequence is
that Jewish social service agencies helping needy elderly Jews in the
former Soviet Union with Looted Asset Class funds have a morally
troubling two-tier assistance program. Elderly Jewish Holocaust
survivors receive more assistance than equally needy elderly Jews
who are not Holocaust survivors because only the survivors can
25 0
receive help financed by the Swiss banks settlement fund.
The principal difficulty with the payments to slave laborers,
refugees, and social service agencies from the perspective of
Aristotelian corrective justice is that it is difficult to regard the Swiss
banks as being responsible for the wrongs inflicted on former slave
laborers, refugees, and needy elderly Holocaust survivors benefiting as
members of the Looted Assets Class. The banks' lack of responsibility
is clearest in the case of the refugees. The refugees suffered because of
247. See supra note 205.
248. Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at 18 (explaining eligibility requirements).
249. From an Aristotelian perspective it may seem troubling that social service agencies are
the direct recipients of Looted Assets Class funds, not Holocaust victims. But since the agencies
must spend the funds to assist victims, it still seems fair to regard victims, rather than agencies,
as the ultimate recipients of the funds.
250. JDC ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 181, at 36.
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the actions of the Swiss government, not the Swiss banks. Yet the
payments for their harms are coming from a fund paid by two banks to
which the Swiss government made no contribution. There are more
plausible connections between the Swiss banks and the former slave
laborers and the needy elderly Holocaust survivors who are being
assisted by social service agencies. While Swiss banks did not employ
slave labor, many of the organizations that used slave labor in
Germany during World War II also used the Swiss banks. The banks,
therefore, may have profited from slave labor. 251 Likewise, Swiss
banks can be viewed as having profited at the expense of Holocaust
victims in the Looted Assets Class because Swiss banks laundered
assets looted by the Third Reich. 252 Still, the historical evidence
linking the banks to the suffering of slave laborers and Holocaust
victims in the Looted Assets Class generally is less developed than the
evidence connecting the banks to the withholding of accounts. 253 For
example, under available evidence, few Holocaust survivors in the
Looted Assets Class would be able to establish that the assets that the
Nazis looted from them passed through Swiss banks. 254 From a strict
Aristotelian perspective, then, in funding a settlement being used to
compensate slave laborers, refugees, and needy Holocaust survivors,
Credit Suisse and UBS would appear to be paying for wrongs to which
they are not clearly connected. Notably, though, the two banks are
doing so at their own insistence, as they requested that the settlement
release all Swiss entities from potential liability for Holocaust-related
claims .255
Setting aside the difficulty of regarding the payments as being
funded by actors who wronged the recipients, the payments are for
violations of protected interests. The Holocaust survivors receiving aid
251. See Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at Annexes G-33 to -36 (describing relationships
between Swiss entities and German industries), Annexes H-52 to -59 (describing relationships
between Swiss firms, including Swiss banks, and German entities that exploited slave labor).
252. Id. at Annexes G-25 to -32. Although commercial banks including, perhaps, Credit
Suisse, were also involved, much of the laundering of gold appears to have been done by the
Swiss National Bank, the central bank, which did not contribute to the settlement fund. Id. at
Annexes G-25, G-28.
253. See id. at Annexes H-52 to -58 (referring to the lack of prior research about the ties
between German firms that used slave labor and Swiss firms, but concluding that there were
"pervasive interrelationships among German entities that exploited slave labor and the Swiss
economy, particularly Swiss financial institutions"); id. at Annexes I-1 to -7 (discussing historical
evidence of slave labor use by Swiss-owned firms); id. at Annexes G-1 to -58 (discussing the
extent of Nazi plunder, Swiss involvement in laundering looted assets, and the difficulty of
determining what happened to Nazi plunder decades after World War II).
254. Id. at Annex G-39.
255. Swift, supra note 43, at 54 ("Swiss banks insisted on closure for themselves and all
Swiss entities.").
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as members of the Looted Assets Class almost certainly suffered
violations of their property rights, as "[t]here is hardly a victim of the
Nazi Regime who did not have his or her assets looted."256 Slave
laborers were denied control of their persons and forced to work for
the profit of others. 25 7 Refugees were denied entry to Switzerland,
expelled, and forced to return to dangerous situations, or they were
admitted but then mistreated-for example, by being interned. 258 As
mentioned above, though, it is not clear how much these violations
should be attributed to Credit Suisse and UBS.
An additional problem with the payments to the slave laborers,
refugees, and needy survivors in the Looted Assets class is that it is
difficult to regard these payments as remedying the wrongs that these
individuals suffered, regardless of whether remediation is defined as
restoration or repair of wrongful losses. The redress program is not
calculating individualized payments for slave laborers, refugees, or
Holocaust victims whose assets may have been laundered through
Swiss banks, partly because of the significant transaction costs that
individualized payments would entail. 259 Instead, slave laborers and
refugees are receiving flat payments. 260 Needy Holocaust survivors
receiving social services financed by Looted Asset Class funds get
assistance such as food packages, medical help, and emergency
assistance. 261 The payments to slave laborers, refugees, and social
service agencies for needy survivors are symbolic, rather than
compensatory. 262 While entirely understandable on pragmatic
grounds, the decision to make symbolic payments nonetheless makes
it harder to regard the payments as satisfying the remedial
requirements of corrective justice. To recap, the payments for bank
account claims seem easier to justify as Aristotelian corrective justice
than the payments to slave laborers, refugees, and social service
256. Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at Annex G-2.
257. "Slave Labor means work for little or no remuneration actually or allegedly performed
by individuals involuntarily at the insistence, direction, or under the auspices of the Nazi
Regime." Exhibit 1 to Plan of Allocation, supra note 200, at Class Action Settlement Agreement §
1.
258. Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at Annexes J-1 to -37 (discussing Switzerland's
treatment of wartime refugees and the composition of the Refugee Class under Settlement
Agreement).
259. Id. at 20, 23.
260. Slave laborers each received $1,450. Refugees denied entry into Switzerland each
received $3,625. Refugees who were admitted to Switzerland each received $725. Statistics,
supranote 206.
261. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 302 F. Supp. 2d 89, 102-03 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
262. See, e.g., Plan of Allocation, supra note 167, at Annex J-37 (describing recommended
payments for refugees denied entry as "essentially symbolic" and payments for refugees who
were admitted into Switzerland but mistreated as "largely symbolic").
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agencies to assist needy Holocaust survivors who are members of the
Looted Assets Class.
b. Nozickian CorrectiveJustice
While the payments for bank account claims may be justified
as Aristotelian corrective justice, these payments also seem to be
defensible as Nozickian corrective justice. However, it is equally
difficult to justify the payments to slave laborers, refugees, and social
service agencies as Nozickian corrective justice.
As discussed above, Nozick's principle of rectification creates a
freestanding duty and right to rectification. 263 However, at least three
conditions must be satisfied to justify redress under this principle of
rectification: (1) the wrong for which redress is being provided must be
a violation of a protected interest; (2) the redress must be rectifying
this wrong; and (3) rectification cannot worsen the situation of others,
consistent with the Nozickian proviso.
i. Conversion of Bank Accounts
The banks' withholding of bank accounts after the war clearly
constitutes a violation of a protected interest for which rectification is
due. By withholding the accounts, the banks improperly converted the
funds for the banks' own use. 264 Although Nozick does not define the
principle of justice in transfer, the conversion of others' funds is
similar to some of his examples of unjust transfers justifying
265
rectification, such as theft or fraud.
The payments for the bank account claims also come very close
to Nozick's first-best conception of rectification. Under that conception,
rectification involves transferring holdings to the persons who would
have held them had there been no violation of the principles of justice
in acquisition and/or transfer. 266 As mentioned above, the payment of
bank accounts follows a highly individualized process in which
claimants are matched to bank accounts. In turn, successful claimants
receive payments based on estimates of the value of the accounts they
are claiming, adjusted for inflation. In other words, the claims
resolution process strives to the greatest extent possible to pay out
what the banks withheld. Still, a purist might object that even this
individualized process does not satisfy the Nozickian ideal. For
263.
264.
265.
266.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra note 243.
See supra text accompanying note 139.
NoziCK, supra note 126, at 152-53.
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example, payments likely are being made to individuals who would
not have received the funds if the banks had not withheld them after
the war, because relatives who already have died would have cashed
out the accounts after the war and spent the proceeds on resettlement.
In addition, the process only examines how much the Swiss banks
withheld and does not go back further and correct any violations of the
principles of justice in acquisition or transfer by the original
depositors or their forebears.
Assuming,
though, that
the
individualized
process
approximates Nozick's first-best conception of rectification, the only
remaining issue to consider in attempting to justify the bank account
payments is whether rectification is worsening the condition of others,
contrary to the proviso. Credit Suisse and UBS likely would have
preferred to retain the $1.25 billion that they paid to settle the claims
against them. As mentioned above, they settled only in the face of
considerable political and legal pressure in the United States.
However, the fact that the $1.25 billion was extracted from Credit
Suisse and UBS does not mean that they-or anyone else-are worse
off in a relevant sense. Recall that under the Nozickian proviso, a
transfer worsens a person's condition only if it leaves the actor worse
off than it would be in the state of nature. There is no way that the
banks, their shareholders, or their employees are worse off as a result
of the settlement than they would be in the state of nature. Indeed,
the banks probably would not exist in the state of nature.
ii. Other Wrongs
Although the bank account payments appear justifiable as
Nozickian corrective justice, it is harder to justify the payments to
slave laborers, refugees, and social service agencies to assist needy
Holocaust survivors. In their favor, the payments are for violations of
protected interests. This is most clear in the case of the payments to
slave laborers and social service agencies for needy survivors. After
all, slavery and theft are among the unjust transfers that Nozick gives
as examples of violations of the principle of justice in transfer for
which rectification is due. 267 It is more difficult to characterize
Switzerland's refusal to admit refugees, or its mistreatment of some of
those that it admitted, as violating the principles of justice in
acquisition and/or transfer and therefore violating a protected
interest. But it may be possible. The refusal to admit and the
mistreatment could be regarded in Nozick's terms as "forcibly
267. Id. at 152.
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exclud[ing] others from competing in exchanges" 268 because these
actions kept refugees from coming to Switzerland and limited the
terms under which those admitted could participate in Swiss society.
Among the motivations for Switzerland's restrictive wartime refugee
policies was a concern that refugees would take jobs from unemployed
Swiss. 269 On this basis, one might argue that excluding refugees and
limiting the freedom of movement of those who were admitted was a
form of economic protectionism that "forcibly" forbade "others from
competing in exchanges."
It is also clear that the payments to slave laborers, refugees,
and social service agencies for needy Holocaust survivors do not
violate the Nozickian proviso. Again, the two Swiss banks that paid
the settlement were left without $1.25 billion that they otherwise
would have had. However, the banks are better off than they would be
in the state of nature where they probably would not exist.
The real obstacle to justifying these payments under the
Nozickian principle of rectification is that it is difficult to view them as
remedying the wrongs for which they are being made. As mentioned
above, the payments to slave laborers and refugees are flat, nonindividuated payments that bear no relationship to the hardships that
the recipients suffered or to any benefits that accrued to the banks (or
the Swiss government) from serving clients who used slave labor (or
excluding or mistreating wartime refugees). The assistance that needy
survivors receive from social service agencies also is unrelated to the
harms that the survivors endured due to the banks' laundering of
looted assets or the banks' profits from laundering. As a result, it is
difficult to regard the payments to slave laborers, refugees, and social
service agencies for needy survivors as embodying Nozick's
individualized process for determining how holdings would have been
distributed.
Nor do the payments seem to embody the ambitious program of
distributive justice that Nozick suggests might be an acceptable
alternative, given the difficulty of achieving the ideal. A great deal of
effort has gone into distributing the slave labor and refugee payments
and the aid for needy Holocaust survivors, and these efforts have had
tangible and intangible benefits for many. However, it is still difficult
to regard the payments and aid as the product of a comprehensive
program of distributive justice, which Nozick suggests legitimately
could take the place of an individualized rectification process.

268. Id.
269. Plan of Allocation, supranote 167, at Annex J-13.
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In summary, it is easier to justify the bank account payments
than the payments to slave laborers, refugees, and social service
agencies for needy survivors under both the Aristotelian duty of repair
and Nozick's principle of rectification. It is difficult to characterize the
latter payments as Aristotelian corrective justice because they are
being made by a settlement fund paid by two banks whose connection
to the use of slave labor, the mistreatment of refugees, and looted
assets is hard to establish, and the payments are symbolic rather than
compensatory. Under Nozickian corrective justice, it is the symbolic
quality of the latter payments that is problematic because the
principle of rectification is not agent specific.
From a broader perspective, it is notable for two reasons that
the bank account payments are easier to justify as corrective justice
than the payments to slave laborers, refugees, and social service
agencies for needy Holocaust survivors. First, Judge Korman has
indicated that, as a matter of law, the claims for the withholding of
270
bank accounts were the strongest claims against the Swiss banks.
Thus, his legal conclusion seems to align with corrective justice
theory. Second, many people, if asked, likely would rank profiting
from forced labor and the refusal to admit-and the mistreatment ofrefugees as more heinous than withholding bank accounts. However,
paradoxically, more than sixty years after the end of World War II, it
seems that the payments for a wrong to property are easier to justify
than the payments for wrongs to persons. This counter-intuitive result
is an example of the moral complexity of claims for redress for
historical injustices that raises questions about the merits of our
current societal preoccupation with correcting past wrongs.
CONCLUSION
Since the end of World War II, survivors of the Holocaust and
other injustices have published memoirs recounting their horrific
experiences. 271 Some of the children of survivors of the Holocaust and
other injustices also have written about the impact of these injustices
on them and their parents. One poignant book by a child of Holocaust
survivors is After Such Knowledge, a memoir published in 2004 by Eva
Hoffman. Born shortly after World War II to two Polish Jewish
Holocaust survivors, Hoffman emigrated to Canada in 1959 with her

270. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 302 F. Supp. 2d 89, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
271. See Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence: Outraging the Body Politic in
the Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 835-36 n.655 (2002) (listing memoirs by
Holocaust survivors).
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family. 272 Hoffman now lives in London, England and Cambridge,
Massachusetts after having spent a great deal of her adult life in the
United States. Movingly, Hoffman writes that "[t]he statute of
limitations on the great cataclysms of the twentieth century is
running out. '273 She emphasizes "that mourning must ...come to its
end." 274 "Sixty years later,... and after all that can be done has been
done, it may also be time to turn away, gently, to let" go of the
Holocaust. 275 Hoffman by no means is urging that the Holocaust be
forgotten. Nevertheless, she suggests that the moral right to demand
redress for it is fading as time passes. According to Hoffman, the
moral rights of individuals like her to make demands of Germany are
276
not as strong as those of the direct victims of the Holocaust.
By definition, advocates of redress for historical injustices
resist the idea that the statute of limitations has run on the wrongs
for which they seek redress. 277 At the same time, they, like Hoffman,
often would prefer to leave the past behind. But to do so, they argue, it
is first necessary for society to undertake additional remedial
measures to address the present effects of past wrongs. For example,
in a well-known article advocating reparations as a progressive tool of
legal change, Mari Matsuda argues that "[r]eparations claims are
based on continuing stigma and economic harm. The wounds are fresh
and the action timely given ongoing discrimination." 278 More recently,
in arguing that there is a moral obligation to remedy slavery and past
discrimination against African Americans, Kim Forde-Mazrui
expresses a profound concern with the vast present-day disparities
279
between African Americans and whites.
But the argument for addressing current injustices by
revisiting the past discounts the complex moral issues raised by
attempts to redress past injustices many years later. The historical
wrongs for which redress has been sought in the United States are
grievous, and they deserve to be condemned loudly. Sometimes redress
requiring a significant commitment of resources also may be justified,
even many years after the event. But as I have argued, it may be
difficult to justify redress measures as a deterrent strategy, as
272. HOFFMAN, supranote 30, at 82.
273. Id. at 243.
274. Id. at 279.
275. Id. at 233.
276. Id. at 126.
277. E.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 9, at 738.
278. Matsuda, supra note 41, at 381-82.
279. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 9, at 695-97 (cataloguing the social, economic, and healthrelated disparities between African Americans and whites).
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consistent with distributive justice, or as a form of corrective justice.
Moreover, even if redressing a particular injustice could be justified on
one or more of these bases, to justify fully redressing that injustice, it
also would be necessary to defend pursuing that basis. In this article, I
have not broached the complex task of defending the pursuit of
deterrence, distributive justice, or corrective justice. 28 0
I conclude with a suggestion. In light of the difficulty of
justifying the redress of historical injustices, maybe we should
concentrate more on tackling present injustices, rather than focusing
on the past and how it affects the present. 28 1 There is certainly no
shortage of pressing current injustices in the United States and
elsewhere to which we could devote our attention. Recall, for instance,
the aftermaths of Hurricane Katrina and the Asian tsunami and the
genocide in Darfur. While it is important to memorialize the past and
honor its victims, it is also vital to remember our obligations to the
present and the future.

280. For a recent article raising questions about the desirability of pursuing corrective
justice specifically, see Ronen Avraham & Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Accident Law For
Egalitarians,12 LEGAL THEORY 181 (2006).
281. See supra note 73 (identifying other sources similarly supporting a focus on present
needs).
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Forensic scientists across a broad array of sub-specialties
have long maintained that they can link an unknown mark (e.g., a
partial fingerprint or tireprint)to a unique source. Yet no scientific
basis exists for this assertion, which is sustained largely by a faulty
probabilistic intuition equating infrequency with uniqueness. This
Essay traces the origins of the individualization claim and
explicates the various failed lines of evidence and argument offered
in its support. We conclude with suggestions for improving the
scientific bases of the forensic identificationsciences.

